

Securitisation of the response to rhinoceros poaching in South Africa

Olga Biegus

BGSOLG001

This dissertation is submitted for the degree of Master of Philosophy

In the Department of Public Law

Supervisor

Annette Hübschle – Finch

Word count: 24 874

University of Cape Town

February 2018

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Acknowledgements

To all who have supported me in this journey, I am deeply thankful for your guidance and motivation.

A special regard for my supervisor, Dr. Annette Hubschle -Finch for challenging me and questioning the obvious.

I am also immensely grateful to the University of Cape Town for the financial support that greatly helped in sustaining my studies and opened new horizons.

To my personal inspiration, Christian, I would like to thank you for giving me faith in accomplishing this project and supporting my journey through meanders of academics writing.

Finally, to my dear parents, Aleksander and Danuta, whom I will always be grateful for their love and giving me courage to reach my goals. You supported me without limits and always believed in me. I dedicate this work to you.

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Abstract

The thesis examines conditions and nature of securitisation of a rhinoceros anti-poaching response in South Africa after 2010. In a surge of rising numbers of animals being illegally hunt for their horns and other parts, the country awoke in a scramble over effective mitigation measures. Through lenses of securitisation theory, I analyse historical and social contexts, that led a range of state and non-state actors in framing rhinoceros poaching as an emergency and helped in proclaiming it a national security threat. Aimed to secure the survival of rhinoceros in South Africa and beyond, the securitisation was achieved through chain of practices that have been introduced over the last decade in the country. Applying sociological understanding of the theory that draws on Bourdieu's concept of the field and Foucauldian elements of theory of governmentality, I focus on evolving character of such practices, which effected in a securitised response to poaching. According to this approach, actors and audience inclined in power relations produce new meanings and practices that aim to eliminate, the threat. They do so by applying extraordinary measures, such as creating new policies or drawing attention and resources to the pronounced threat. I argue that international actors initiated the security framing of broader wildlife crime issues, which South Africa eventually accepted and reinforced as a dominant narrative. Aligning with the global actors was possible because of the historical security-based politics and aimed to achieve more favourable image of country's tourism industry and attract financial support. On the other hand, donors' help did not come without interests. These were linked to Western-oriented concepts of nature and wildlife conservation informed by security discourse. By using national security as a justification for extraordinary measures, such as delegating anti-poaching agenda to the security cluster or allocating more funds to it, South Africa was able to gain more control over resources rich areas though applying wildlife security narrative.

The research utilises information from South African government agencies, non-governmental organisation as well as other actors engaged in broadly understood conservation topic within last decade. By analysing laws, strategies, policies, official briefings, independent and academic reports as well as media articles, I construct a timeline of practices that led to securitising the rhinoceros anti-poaching strategies. The thesis comprises of review of the existing literature on security and securitisation studies as well as critical analysis of trends global environmental politics, followed

by specific theoretical approach and methodology that allows to analyse key elements. The research concludes with identifying potential risks and opportunities of securitisation, depending on development scenarios and provides the list of recommendations to mitigate potential negative impacts.

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Abbreviations and acronyms

AfRSG African Rhino Specialist Group

ANC African National Congress

APU Anti-Poaching Unit

ARCP African Rhino Range States' African Rhino Conservation Plan

CAWT Coalition Against Wildlife Trafficking

CBD Convention on Biological Diversity

CEO Chief Executive Officer

CI Conservation International

CITES Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora

Civil Aviation Authority (CAA)

COP Conference of the Parties

CPZ Composite Protection Zone

CS Copenhagen School

DAFF Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries

DCPI Directorate for Priority Crime Investigations

DEA Department of Environmental Affairs

DEAT Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism

DoD Department of Defence

DoJ Department of Justice

DSO Directorate of Special Operations

DTI Department of Trade and Industry

ECC Ecological Carrying Capacity

EKZNW Ezemvelo KwaZulu Natal Wildlife

ESPU Endangered Species Protection Unit

EU European Union

FFI Fauna and Flora International

GEF Global Environmental Facility

GFI Global Financial Integrity

GLC Great Lembobo Conservancy

GLTFCA Great Limpopo Transfrontier Conservation Area

GRAA Game Rangers Association of Africa

HESC Hoedspruit Endangered Species Centre

IAPF International Anti-Poaching Foundation

ICCWC International Consortium on Combating Wildlife Crime

INTERPOL International Criminal Police Organization

IPZ Intensive (rhino) Protection Zone

ISMA Integrated Strategic Management Approach to Rhinoceros

IUCN International Union for Conservation of Nature

IUCN International Union for Conservation of Nature

JPZ Joint Protection Zone

KNP Kruger National Park

KZN KwaZulu Natal

MCC Medicines Control Councils

MOU Memorandum of Understanding

NATJOINTS National Joint Operation Structure

NCWRU National Wildlife Crime Reaction Unit

NEMBA National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act

NGO Non-Government Organisation

NISCWT National Integrated Strategy to Combat Wildlife Trafficking

NPA National Prosecuting Authority

NPO Non-Profit Organisation

NSSRSA National Strategy for Safety and Security of Rhinoceros in South Africa

OSCAP Outraged SA Citizens Against Rhino Poaching

PDZ Peripheral Development Zone

PHASA Professional Hunters Association South Africa

PMG Parliamentary Monitoring Group

PPF Peace Parks Foundation

PROA Private Rhino Owners Association

QUEMIC Unique Solutions by Dynamic People

RhODIS Rhino DNA Indexing System

RRP Rhino Response Project

RSMP Rural Safety Management Plan

SA south Africa

SADC Southern African Development Community

SADF South African Defence Forces

SANDF South African National Defence Force

SANParks South African National Parks

SAPS South African Police Service

SARS South African Revenue Service

SSA State Security Agency

SSC Species Survival Commission

TEC Transnational Environmental Crime

TNC The Nature Conservancy

TOC Transnational Organised Crime

TOPS Threatened or Protected Species

TRAFFIC Wildlife Trade Monitoring Network

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

UK United Kingdom

UN United Nations

UNEP United Nations Environmental Programme

UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

UNGA United Nations General Assembly

UNODC United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime

UNSC United Nations Security Council

US United States of America

VETPaw Veterans Empowered to Protect African Wildlife

WB World Bank

WCO World Customs Organisation

WCS Wildlife Conservation Society

WWF-SA World Wildlife Fund of South Africa

ZSL Zoological Society London

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CHAPTER 1 – LITERATURE REVIEW, ARGUMENT AND RESEARCH QUESTION

1.1 Introduction

The problem of illegal hunting and trafficking in wildlife on global scale taps into the insecurities originating from the Cold War. Continuing the reproduction of security regimes, many governments look for new territories to deploy their armies and cultural paradigms. In this new arrangement, global actors find themselves translating national security into language of emerging challenges. Between these, a special place on the map of global insecurities takes Southern hemisphere with abundance of natural resources, which the North increasingly sees as desirable. Without recognizing the harm that once have crippled development of the south, a scramble over the African continent has new disguise – environmental security. A broad term, it has been discussed within growing complexity over past few decades. Within it, the environmental crime and, specifically, wildlife crime. Still a multifaceted phenomenon, it has been translated into global politics through images of endangered wildlife and a wilderness, concepts stemming from neo-colonial nostalgia. These narratives have been successfully informing the understanding of what nature is and how it should be protected. In such asymmetric global power relations, (southern) Africa became a symbol of a quest in the name of development and peace. These ideas have gained more currency when emerging markets, political changes and carefully doctored social inequalities created a demand-supply chain for the wild rarities. It has resulted is an enormous illegal market of wild fauna and flora. In an intersection of transnational organised crime, social development and neoliberal conservation, a recycled security regime emerged. This thesis is examining a specific occurrence of such redressed security process/practices, that have materialised in South Africa in a dawn of wildlife crime surge. Informed by the theoretical framework of securitization studies I examine these practices to in order to understand if and how South African governmental agencies created conditions for securitised response to a problem of poaching of one of the country's natural capital and pride – the illegal killing of rhinoceros. By focusing on the anti-poaching strategy for this specific species I analyse background of such security frame, its development and changing power narratives that contributes to producing the militarised responses that bear a risk of closing the discussion of poaching and trafficking without addressing their causes.

Academic literature has started to discuss these, but, despite engaging with security studies terminology, there has been only a handful of researches that apply a theoretical framework in its full extend, not peripheries. For that reason, I have decided to engage with the topic of wildlife crime by focusing on one of the ‘global hotspots’: making headlines for ‘rhino wars’ and an experimental ground for different anti-wildlife crime strategies, South Africa’s ‘rhino safety and security’ approach became a choice. Given a proliferation of politics, conservation and business narratives, it is important to closely observe the constantly changing picture, where violence become a symbol of development much like in the pre-1994 era. Secondly, it is important to interrogate academic and policy discourses themselves. Informed by specific schools of thoughts they provide certain background as part of the power struggles over the ‘right’/correct description of reality. Aware of this paradigmatic approach, I aim to answer the question on how has the securitisation of the rhinoceros anti- poaching agenda reshaped mechanisms of conservation in South Africa since 2010. The research comprises of discursive and document analysis of actors involved and regimes of practices they apply to produce security response. The analysis of context supports understanding of why such practices have been more successful than others and how they have been used within broader conservation practices, that in South Africa have converged with global financial regimes. I then discuss one of the impacts of such regime of practice with brings plethora of critique from various streams of scholars. By all that I aim to determine the nature and level of success of securitisation process that I claim has occurred in South African politics regarding the rhinoceros. The thesis consists of four chapters. The first discussed the most important developments in academic literature, directions and gaps that I aim to address through this thesis. Chapter 2 provides a more comprehensive idea of security studies, followed by a methodology subchapter with an explanation of a paradigmatic approach and employed analytical strategy. Chapter 3 consists of an analysis of collected material and findings, while chapter 4 provides summary of the research and potential avenues of further research.

1.2 Security and environment

Growing global efforts have been directed towards environmental pressures since the early 1970s, when political debate began to address such problems in the context of security (Falk, 1971). The evolution of the concept of ‘environmental threat’ began with the 1972 Human Environment conference in Stockholm, and by 1987 had resulted in the coining of the term ‘environmental security’, which appeared in the World Commission on Environment and Development Report (UN, 1987), known as the Brundtland Report. Few years later, separate development of the environmental security notion strengthened the conservation doctrine during the Earth Summit in 1992, which brought, *inter alia*, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) that explicitly identified threats to further existence of flora and fauna, that in result threaten human existence. In 2007, the United Nations Security Council held discussions regarding the security implications of climate change, albeit inconclusively (United National Security Council, 2007). Nevertheless, the narrative of a proliferation of threats, deepening scarcity of natural resources, aggressive pollution and progressive loss of biodiversity gained greater political importance in subsequent years and has been utilised by a collective of international actors in what is considered a sub-area of environmental protection, namely, conservation of natural resources. Within this theme, conservation of wildlife globally became of special concern, as reflected by the establishment of the Convention on International Trade of Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) in 1973 and Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) in 1992.

Over the past two decades, researchers have considered how a convergence of politics, protection of the natural environment, and security has produced new conservation regimes, as well as the potential and real impacts of associated mechanisms. This chapter examines the different bodies of scholarship that explore the new merging of environment, politics and capital found in securitisation theory, and the tradition of political ecology, focussing on phenomena of nature conservation, environmental security and international organised crime. In following paragraphs, I firstly briefly explained the term ‘securitisation’, which I expand upon in chapter 2, and continue with a mapping of selected literature that critically contributes to the topic of environmental security.

A wider definition of ‘securitisation’ has been problematised by Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998) as referring to sectors other than the exclusively military. According to the authors, after the end of the Cold War, the definition of security should have been redefined and widened to reflect changes underway in global politics, such as the environment.

Dubbed ‘Copenhagen school of security studies’ (CS) has since been developed and defined, predominantly by Thierry Balzacq, whose approach to securitisation theory will be applied in this thesis. His main claim is that the process ‘is a rule-governed practice, the success of which does not necessarily depend on the existence of a real threat, but on the discursive ability to effectively endow a development with such a specific complexion’ (Balzacq, 2005: 179).

Arisen from the Copenhagen School new framework of analysis initiate the environmental security studies (Buzan, Waever, de Wilde, 1998) analysing its character in the dawn of environmental crime and climate change. Trombetta (2008) critiques the definition of securitisation according to the Copenhagen school, and raises the question of the extent to which environmental problems, for example climate change, produce new forms of securitisation, where identification of an enemy and what is called a ‘securitising move’¹ are not necessary. Similarly, the urgency of situation, as proclaimed by Copenhagen School is only rhetorical, as the climate change framework being only recently established, it is impossible to act immediately. In this sense, environmental securitisation transforms the security practices and provisions by expanding the logic of securitisation provided by Copenhagen scholars ((Trombetta, 2011: 148). Environmental security should, therefore, be seen as non-conventional; my approach to the subject and its body of research will reflect that.

Floyd (2008) gives an overview of environmental security developments in the United States (US) and their significance. Military involvement (such as US defence environmental strategy) creates environmental insecurities, amongst others, (Ibid: 52), recalling the Toronto group and Douglas Homer-Dixon’s thesis (199) of environmental conflict being triggered by environmental resource scarcity (Kaplan,

¹ As defined by Wæver, Buzan de Wilde (1998), securitising move is a speech act that proclaims a threat and measures. Later school scholars, such as Michael Williams (2003) or Balzacq (2011) argued that securitising move is constituted by equally verbal and non-verbal (practices) acts. See Chapter 2 for theoretical details.

1994). Many later studies provide an opposite conclusion, however, contending that it is an abundance of resources that leads to them desired on a global scale. These two concepts are rejected by ecologists, who argue that neither abundance nor scarcity should be the starting point of the debate, as they are the product of relations between 'political economy and mechanisms of access, control, and struggle over environmental resources' (Peluso & Watts, 2001: 93). Environmental security, as Floyd argues, is also understood as human security. Finally, she highlights de-securitising efforts undertaken through environmental peacebuilding, realised through projects such as cross-border conservation areas (Floyd, 2008: 60).

Dalby (2013) and Gemenne et al. (2014) provide a similar overview of developments in environmental security, but stress asymmetric power relations that, if accompanied by poorly applied global environmental policies that do not secure access to resources and land for the most vulnerable communities, will inevitably bring large-scale insecurities and conflict. The conclusion to be taken from the above literature is a recurring theme of environmental justice as an outcome of global power dynamics.

Environmental resource policies, including wildlife, during the Bill Clinton and George Bush administrations analysed through the lenses of securitisation (and desecuritisation) framework show main contribution to the discussion. Firstly, of the moral judgement in relation to the human security that has not been developed despite myriads of policies. Secondly, due to a lack of understanding of the fact that sustainable development is not the same as 'economic development' (Floyd, 2010: 179). Finally, this issue was only considered to be of concern when associated with underdevelopment, and as such could lead to terrorism. This powerful research shows that a terrorism narrative, conveniently linked to any available security threat, real or not, has been present in US foreign policy long before wildlife trafficking was treated as a transnational organised crime.

Wildlife crime analysed through the lens of securitisation theory has only recently started to be explored (Elliott and Schaedla, 2016). In a chapter dedicated to securitisation of transnational environmental crime (TEC) and militarisation of conservation in Africa, Elliott (2016) summarises the concerns of many scholars collectively associated with the political ecology school of thought, bringing long historical assemblages of state and non-state actors including private security firms, non-profit organisations involved in anti-poaching training and surveillance. She

outlines the development of the threat narrative and unjustified claims of local and foreign political actors that link poaching and wildlife trafficking to terrorist or other criminal groups while overlooking the extent of wildlife crime and actors involved in it along with colonial and postcolonial security and policing methods employed by existing state regimes. She concludes: ‘the risk of narrowing the policy focus to one of defence against threat rather than one which seeks to address the causes of insecurities [...] may well be counterproductive in responding to the challenges of transnational environmental crime’ (Elliott, 2016: 83). South Africa’s contribution to the development of the illegal wildlife trade while fetishizing the concept of foreign force as threat is highlighted, as is the criminalisation of local populations within a culture of impunity. Nevertheless, the country is not the sole focus. Despite being the leading example of wildlife crime hotspot in the relevant literature, South Africa is not examined through the prism of securitisation theory.

Recent academic literature analyses environmental politics from the perspective of Michel Foucault’s (2007) theory governmentality (Fletcher, 2017)² or, by considering the transition from the politics of science to that of pre-emption in the light of a wildlife crime (or broadly environmental) emergency (Büscher, 2017). In this thesis, I apply such an understanding of the response to precariousness, manifested through the surge in wildlife crime. However, I argue that such precariousness is produced by, and is in fact one of, the main securitising practices through which state and non-state actors gain control and benefit.

Above selection of the literature is an excerpt from a wide scholarship on security-environment nexus. It lays a foundation for the analysis of development and mechanisms of responses to environmental crime and provide a setting for the

² Fletcher uses late Foucault’s concept of multiple governmentalities (Foucault, 2007) to analyse environmental politics and consequences such different forms of governmentalities may have on the future of environment and politics itself. The text is one of few analyses that applies concepts present in securitisation analyses. It does not however, relate to a specific South African context, but rather, provide an interesting description of theoretical landscape that is emerging in analysis of environmental politics or, seen otherwise, political ecology.

research. Based on outlined theoretical concepts I zoom into the specific phenomenon and use them to unpack security response to rhinoceros poaching in South Africa.

1.3 Political ecology

Aside from international relations, governmentality and security studies, a significant body of literature³ situated in the field of political ecology provides analysis of aspects of security and environment. The main thread of discussion focuses on the ways in which the environment in general, and conservation practices in particular, are being instrumentalised to further security agendas. This, according to the authors, is done in the interest of security, or in the interest of financial gains effected through land appropriation, ‘primitive’ accumulation and natural resource control. Many of the scholars point towards consequences of these practices that change the landscape of conservation globally, the effects of which are often borne by several segments of society, reinforcing historical inequalities. In conservation (and global environmental governance), specifically in relation to wildlife protection measures, the so-called ‘wildlife poaching and trafficking crisis’ is being used to capture attention and resources that in turn generates more attention among involved actors such as civil society, governmental, and inter-governmental organisations. Ali (2007) and Ramutsindela (2007) outline ways of embedding security, including human security, into environmental protection, drawing on the idea that geopolitical peace and security can be delivered through ‘peace parks’, or Transfrontier Conservation Areas (hereafter TFCA). The author discusses the promise and shortfalls of a solution that brings with it the history of forced resettlement or land appropriation for conservation means (Ramutsindela, 2007, 103-20). The story of TFCAs sets the scene for deeper analysis of conservation goals and methods, predominantly in southern Africa. It explores how the concept of environmental protection, or more specifically, conservation, evolved into a new powerful narrative where ecology may supposedly be achieved through peace, scrupulously utilising South Africa’s obsessive policing and constant state of (in)security manifested through the entrepreneurial Peace Parks Foundation (Massé & Lunstrum, 2016: 231).

³ See: Peluso and Vandergeest (2011), Ojeda (2012), Ybarra (2012), Humphreys and Smith (2011), Humphreys and Smith (2014), Lunstrum (2014), White (2014), Duffy et al. (2015), Duffy (2016), Cavanagh & Himmelfarb (2015), Lombard (2016), Massé & Lunstrum (2016), Marijnen and Verweijen (2016), Kelly and Ybarra (2016)

The landscape of southern African efforts in securitising the responses to poaching and wildlife trafficking has been described in various terms, focussing on a variety of aspects. The growing body of political ecology literature has been impacted by the term ‘green militarisation’ (Lunstrum, 2014) as a direct effect of the merging of fields of security and conservation. The militarisation of South Africa, although not new to security studies⁴, brings a new field into focus – ‘the use of military, and paramilitary (military-like) actors, techniques, technologies, and partnerships in the pursuit of conservation’ (Lunstrum, 2014: 817). This research provides historical and semantic analysis of the development of a securitised response to the poaching crisis but does not unpack the mechanisms and interests of actors involved in these interesting power assemblages.

Although the theme of violence in conservation has been researched in the past (Ellis, 1994, Neumann, 2004), Lunstrum, rightfully, problematises it as an emerging trend in conservation. Drawing on it, Büscher and Ramutsindela (2016) deepen the theme by exploring other types of ‘green violence’, including material green violence (or militarisation, in Lunstrum’s terms), and social and online (or web 2.0) violence (explored elsewhere by Büscher, 2015). Each occurs through a range of actions performed by actors involved: government and its agencies, non-profit organisations forging their own vision of conservation in South Africa, private para-military companies used to protect reserves and parks, or hybrids of the above. What is implied by the authors’ definition is the illegality of practices applied (Büscher & Ramutsindela, 2016: 8). It then has to be portrayed as war for wildlife (Duffy, 2016) and enable other agents to force their aims, that in return effects in socio-economic marginalisation of local inhabitants who do not ‘fit’ the idea of pristine wilderness zones (Büscher et al, 2012). The process further reinforces land dispossession on the one hand and accumulation of capital (resource and control over it) on the other, leaving certain social groups ‘out of the picture’, treating them as surplus (Murray Li, 2012) and unnecessary in the production and implementation of the new vision of parks in Southern Africa. In response, those excluded feel not only denied opportunities, but simultaneously experience the reinforcement of historical inequalities (Hübschle 2016b).

⁴ See for example Cock and Nathan (1989).

Duffy et al. (2015a) point towards implications of such enclosure as potentially enabling the ‘production’ of poachers. One of the most discussed and equally critiqued forces that researchers point to as mechanisms of financialisation, marketisation, privatisation, commodification, and decentralisation within conservation governance are grouped under the term ‘neoliberal conservation’ (Igoe & Brockington, 2007; Holmes & Cavanagh, 2016). For Brockington and Duffy (2011), Igoe, (2010), and Arsel and Büscher (2012), neoliberal conservation is primarily market oriented, and is performed by predominantly northern hemisphere, or Western, non-governmental organisations, promoting win-win rhetoric through a) depoliticised cooperation between governments and non-profits, local governments and populations in what appear to be both conservation and development projects, b) limiting information on power relations and presenting it out of context, using social media and highly visual and emotive materials to appeal to the predominantly Western audiences. Although Igoe (2010: 390) argues that this ‘360-degree marketing’ simplifies and strategizes narratives in campaigns that aim to maximise donations, I argue that such campaigns, especially in the eyes of audience, are not profoundly political. For both organisations and the audience, the message comes from cultural perspective and the socially constructed wilderness (Neumann, 2004: 816). However, it is important to note that some organisations may manipulate and perpetuate values that are profoundly discriminatory and informed by colonial logic (Hübschle, 2016:173-200).

As pointed out by Büscher et al. (2012), one of the practices in forging neoliberal conservation is silencing unconventional narratives and those who promote them. The security agenda that enables neoliberal conservation goes further, however – it produces narratives that can effectively silence these voices. The idea of a poacher, or person hunting illegally, that is posing a threat and is of a threat himself/herself, is exploited by all actors in the creation of further narratives that justify linkage with security. Namely, the poacher is not simply one who hunts illegally – the poacher is a villain, a scrooge, member of criminal syndicate, heartless killer and a terrorist. Such framing, that plays with various symbolics, triggers further security practices – those of surveillance, counterinsurgency and militarisation (Duffy, 2016: 2).

There are two elements from the concept that I apply in understanding practices occurring within securitisation: a) ‘green grabbing’, or ‘the appropriation of land and

resources for environmental ends’ (Fairhead, Leach & Scoones, 2012), and b) narratives, especially referring to security, that accompany such green grabbing.

1.3.1 Accumulation by conservation

In the rich literature on green grabbing, there are certain central concepts that ought to be explained. The first term, green grabbing⁵, constitutes appropriation of land and resources. The appropriation itself, as explained by Fairhead, Leach and Scoones (2012: 238), assumes that ownership, usage rights and control of resources is transferred from public to private. This move includes power dynamics, where commons (and especially the poor) are disposed on the account of wealthy and powerful. Accumulation by dispossession is a further proliferation of accumulation practices performed by various actors, including governments. Accumulation can be primitive, where public land is bought by a private entity and inhabitants are expelled, or it can be the accumulation of capital, where profits from assets are captured and reinvested, concentrating (accumulating) its ownership. For example, profits from wildlife tourism that are not redistributed, but instead invested in buying more land.

As explained by Büscher and Fletcher (2014: 275), accumulation is understood as referring to ‘broader systemic dynamics in global capitalism as a system of accumulation and the role of environmental conservation within this’. Authors expand on the definition of accumulation as per Doane (2012: 20), who explains the term as ‘enclosure of value’ that occurs ‘when environmental organisations from the global North appropriate land that is already well preserved’.

For (Corson & MacDonald, 2012: 264) green accumulation through green dispossession represents yet another form of ‘green grabbing’ which ‘entail[s] not only physical land grabs but also the privatization of rights to nature, the creation of new commodities and markets from nature, the green sanction for otherwise declining forms of capital accumulation and the disabling of institutions that could pose threats to expanded accumulation’. The notion of enclosure and land appropriation for environmental ends, including conservation, is being further explored by several

⁵ The term was first used by journalist John Vidal in the article for The Guardian, describing globally observed lands being bought, or appropriated, for environmental purposes by wealthy individuals or organisations. See Vidal (2008)

scholars.⁶ The more systematic analysis of security and neoliberal conservation is explored by Massé and Lunstrum (2016) and Kelly and Ybarra (2016); Duffy (2014); Duffy et al. (2015), Verweijen and Marijnen (2016) where we read how militarised attitudes towards conservation provide a platform for inter-state, state and international (other states or international non-governmental organisations) actors winning control over land and its resources, and how these impact local populations and the conservation agenda itself.

1.3.2 Security themes in political ecology scholarship

Although security and securitisation processes and practices are being analysed from the perspective of impacts, there is little analysis to date on securitisation as a mode of governance, which aims to answer questions of how, who, why and under which circumstances securitisation occurs, followed by analysing not only impacts but also wider context, the parties involved and the underlying interests and status of these actors, as well as a deeper analysis of discourses that are being exercised: of control, politics of power and capital.

Only a few scholars have touched upon the process of accumulation of resources by employing security and anti-poaching efforts in South Africa. As will be described in detail in the theory section, it requires focusing of resources on the putative security threat and is exercised through speech and performative acts. In the case of South Africa, as Humphreys and Smith (2014) argue, this has been happening through the process of ‘rhinofication’, where ‘rhino poaching and conservation in South Africa have become enveloped within a larger security narrative [...] of national security that sees counter-poaching existing as part of a broad response to both external and internal threats to the state.’ This ‘fortress conservation’ in South Africa, according to the authors, is being exercised through application of ‘security’ discourse as a response to ‘attack from foreign nationals’ as proclaimed by Major General (Retired) Johan Jooste in late 2012, when he was appointed as the head of anti-poaching operations in South African National Parks (SANParks). Here, the authors point out that policies and practices of protection and conservation of one species leave many others

⁶ See: Corson (2011), Brockington and Duffy (2011), Kelly (2011), Peluso and Lund (2011), Matondi and Nhliziyo (2015), Mabele (2016), Matose (2016).

neglected and not sufficiently protected. However, what they do not address is the full network of actors, their practices and the context within which ‘rhinofication’ emerged.

Rademeyer and Shaw (2016), however, contest the idea of an increasing militarisation of the response to rhinoceros poaching, arguing that it is only recently that poaching, and wildlife trafficking have been considered a security threat by South African governmental agencies. A deeper analysis of what resources have been introduced beyond ‘on-the-ground’ militarisation should be applied to better understand the context specific situation. Moreover, as authors argue, political ecology scholars do not differentiate between the discourse and reality. It provides a counterpoint in the discussion on securitisation and shows how it can be overlooked by focussing only on its visible practices, such as critiqued militarisation (Marijnen, 2017). The latter is rather an outcome of securitisation. Furthermore, securitisation does not have to be intentional (Balzacq, 2011), or reflected upon⁷.

The main point of scholars writing about militarisation or rhinofication is the notion of a certain framework of action is inherited from an overly policed and polarised society in case of South Africa, where the response to insubordination was always heavy handed. In this sense, non-reflectively, South African Police Service (SAPS), the Directorate for Priority Crime (also known as Hawks), State Security Agency (SSA), South African National Defence Force (SANDF)⁸, the Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) and South African National Parks (SANParks) and a conglomerate of private actors (including security companies and non-profit organisations), further encouraged by public, mostly in the social media sphere (Büscher, 2016, Lunstrum, 2017), are heading unmistakably towards the same anti-poaching and conservation delivery model as during the apartheid era, which can be summarised through phrases like ‘war on poaching’. In this sense, the security agenda has been always present in South African conservation and has only been strengthened by the surge in poaching, ineffective responses to it, and pressure from international bodies.

⁷ See paragraphs on ‘habitus’ and ‘dispositif’ in Chapter 2

⁸ SANDF forces have been deployed in the Kruger National Park (KNP) as a support for park rangers since 2011 (DEA, 2011)

1.3.3 Accumulation by Securitisation

A broader explanatory spectrum is discussed by Massé and Lunstrum (2016) via the concept of accumulation through securitisation. It provides a vital base for the convergence of security, environmental conservation and market forces through which securitisation is enabled. In essence, authors explore the case of neoliberal conservation, where financial gain is intertwined with a political aspiration of the state to gain control through state and non-state actors across the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Conservation Area (GLTFCA), straddling the border region of South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Specifically, its western, Mozambican side (called the Great Lemboho Conservancy – GLC), adjacent to Kruger National Park, is the scene of land and non-economic dispossession, or green grabbing, enabled by securitisation: '[a]ccumulation thus flows not directly from dispossession, although this is important, but more directly through promises and practices of security' (Massé and Lunstrum, 2016: 234).

The authors further argue that it is security that is of concern to the South African state, rather than anti-poaching and conservation. As such, it is an actual 'currency' of the two states' cooperation that further enables non-state actors to act upon the security concerns through land accumulation and dispossession. For the authors, securitisation is explored as a trigger of green accumulation, where state and non-state actors present highly rational objectives – those of land control and financial gains. Marijnen (2017) applies more of the specific securitisation theory but focusses on European Union practices of securitisation in Democratic Republic of Congo.

Although they explain the mechanisms and practices taking place in the GLC, they fail to discuss the variety of actors involved, or the specific motives and contexts through which the security perspective is so powerful. That is, how the idea of security is specifically used to support the interests of those involved. The authors mention the nuances of securitisation theory, but do not address them in a rigorous manner. Neither they explain context, threat, or actors along with practices described as occurring in the GLC. Finally, the focus of the research is primarily on the GLC, although, while South Africa's role in GLC politics is described as catalyst, the focus is on Mozambican land politics.

What is missing is an explicit analysis of the mechanisms that shape the current anti-poaching agenda in South Africa. Despite the scholarship on security analysis, there is no research referencing the full-bodied securitisation theory as an analytical framework applied to examine environmental politics of response to wildlife crime or poaching specifically. The range of actors, unique history and resources that became of global concern show that a case of securitisation can be only analysed in a local context (South African) because of a specific confluence of the context, actors, audience and security threat. Furthermore, if any actions should be taken to improve the situation, they should be undertaken within this very specific and carefully analysed context.

1.4 Argument and research question

The literature review identifies incomplete research in various areas and conceptual levels. The theory of securitisation has not been specifically used to explain developments in the field of response to wildlife crime in South Africa. Various notions of security or securitisation have been analysed, but the literature does not employ the securitisation theory. In doing so I can fully interrogate security – anti-poaching nexus and unpack the current context, practices and actors involved: government, non- and intergovernmental organisations, civil society and illicit trade networks – all entangled in the process where securitised responses enable rather than disrupt illegal trade. So far, academics have focussed on specific geographies and phenomena that can be included in the securitisation narrative, but it has not been analysed within the securitisation theory framework. More specifically, South Africa, as a country, has never been case studied for its securitised anti-poaching discourse. Similarly, within the discussion on actual and potential impacts, literature has focussed on the most obvious militarised responses and the role they play in perpetuating historical narratives; however, it does so with an inconsistent focus on South Africa.

Finally, the literature only modestly addresses the role of inter-governmental organisations in creating the securitised reality of the responses to rhino poaching and wider conservation efforts in South Africa. Highlighted gaps must be bridged to construct a new, more comprehensive approach that allows us to identify the mechanisms whereby security became a tool in rhinoceros conservation to allow

different actors to capture and accumulate control over anti-poaching responses in South Africa.

In the thesis, I address following questions: how are the agents involved in securitisation? (actors involved in securitisation including securitising actors, audiences or functional actors; power positions of these actors, personal identities or social identifies and referent object and subject); what is the context? (settings and socio-cultural dimension of analysed text material); what are the discursive and non-discursive practices of securitisation being exercised in South Africa? How can they be observed and explained? How security responses impacted conservation practices in South Africa? Finally, whether mechanisms employed are a case of securitisation.

All the above are underpinned by my research question:

How has the response to rhinoceros poaching in South Africa been reshaped and securitised since 2010?

As a result, I expect to produce a comprehensive study of the practices of identified actors in anti-poaching measures applied in public, political and legal spheres and exercised on the ground, defined as a securitisation of anti-poaching efforts and rhinoceros conservation, and the impact this approach achieves from the perspective of identified actors.

1.5 Conclusion

This chapter allows to review existing literature on the intersection of security studies, political ecology that share the debate on progressively militarised conservation and methods applied to address the poaching of iconic species in Southern Africa, and here specifically, of the rhinoceros conservation and anti-poaching agenda, South African government applied. In the following chapter, I explain the theoretical approach to analyse the situation that developed in the country and why I employed it. I further provide methodological apparatus for the analysis of exiting data, that consist of freely available information.

CHAPTER 2 - THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I discuss the theoretical and methodological approach to my research as well as methods applied. The first part is dedicated to a theoretical review of security and securitisation studies explaining the creation and evolution of the term and its meaning. The second section is dedicated specifically to a type of theory I intend to apply to my study and its definition, followed by situating the main premises of the research question within the theory. Finally, I present the methodological approach and methods I apply to address the research question.

2.2 Theory: situating the debate on securitisation

The question of security, its definition and understanding has been broadly related to the field of international relations security studies. Securitisation theory emerges in the stream of non-traditional security studies, that defined a theme of security strictly related to the state and realised through military defence (Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998: 3). Authors initiated the new thought school which argued that such 'narrow' understanding of security, that put the state in the centre of analysis, overlooks important changes in the way security has been understood and applied after the end of the Cold War.

Within last 25 years securitisation has gained importance in attempts to better understand and describe mechanisms of these new fields of security interventions. Securitisation theory has allowed to answer the questions of why and how some public problems gain more security interest than others, how the commitment of collective participation in problems being established in such a prominent way is possible, and how various practices and instruments (legal or policy) can be created. Securitisation studies questions the very idea of security and the processes behind it, asking: what is a security issue? What is a definition of threat? What are the responses to it? How are they orchestrated? What impacts do they produce? (Balzacq, Leonard & Ruzicka, 2016: 496).

The study of securitisation in the environmental sector has been neglected by scholars (see Chapter 1) and does not reflect the dynamic nature of the field. Furthermore, securitisation theory has never been used to describe a very specific subsection of global environmental politics, that of conservation and anti-poaching approaches to what has been expressively captured as ‘poaching crisis’, part of a wider spectrum of offences labelled as illegal wildlife trade, international environmental crime or wildlife trafficking. I aim to address this gap by exploring the politics of response to rhino poaching in South Africa that remains in stark difference with other species being poached and trafficked, and so equally or more endangered), where focus of rhino conservation as a capital and potential option for international trade become a driver of securitisation.

South Africa is home to almost 80 per cent (Emslie et al., 2016: 1) of the global population of rhinoceroses (hereafter referred to as rhino). In response to poaching of a species whose products are treated as the most valuable commodity in the world⁹, the country has undertaken measures that several scholars see partially as green militarisation or green violence. However, none of the research offers a focus on the mechanisms producing such processes in the South African context. Securitisation theory, the nuances of which will be defined in the following paragraphs, offers a comprehensive explanation of the security language that has entered discourse on natural conservation.

The response to rhino poaching in South Africa, as I will show in further chapter, transcends traditional conservation concerns, with the issue being discussed as a national security threat and defence from foreign nationals, and as regards the extraordinary measures that have to be undertaken to tackle it. It is heavily influenced by global environmental politics, merging environment and security into one concept. Most interestingly, it creates a market where exceptional measures are used to secure not only the very existence of the species, but also multimillion rand deals portrayed as conservation and part of a struggle against illegal wildlife trade. This convergence of politics, business, conservation and security can be analysed thoroughly and fully

⁹ There are various reports on the rhino horn price, some (Rademeyer, 2016b; Hubschle, 2016) suggest from \$25,000 to \$ 65,000 per kilogram. The rhino market also includes other derivatives, like foot or ears, but the main market focus is on the horn.

through the prism of securitisation. Before I explain a specific theoretical approach, a wide horizon of security and securitisation studies needs to be explained.

Securitisation's theoretical approach has, since its development, taken many different avenues. Some scholars (Weaver, 2004) distinguish between the Copenhagen, Paris and Welsh or Aberystwyth (sometimes referred to as critical security studies) 'schools' of security studies, that focus on non-traditional security studies. The founding fathers of the such called 'Copenhagen school' (CS), Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, authors of the 'Security: a new framework of analysis' (1998) expanded security studies, arguing that the post-Cold War international security system became much more decentralised (Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998: VI), hence they introduced a 'security complex theory' (Buzan, 1991) to explain the new emerging orders, which would incorporate environmental, political, societal and economic sectors in the analysis. Securitisation is presented as the 'overflow of normal political logic' preceded by exaggerated political focus, or politicisation, of the issue and produces a discourse of 'existential threat' that is performed through speech and accepted by the audience (1998: 24-5). The act itself is defined as a 'securitising move'. The 'new framework of analysis' is the point of departure for any further academic commentary.

Critics see the 'new framework of analysis' as explaining the new phenomena with old theoretical apparatus (McDonald, 2008: 565). Other flaws include a lack of clear definitions of clear criteria of successful securitisation examples and consequently those of a desecuritisation. Floyd (2007: 337) argues, that these two processes cannot be arbitrarily treated as negative or positive, and its moral value ultimately depends on whether effects are improved the situation of a threatened object or worsened it. Finally, Hansen (2000), points out that the early writing on securitisation silences non-existential (ontological) threats, such as identity or gender related. Moreover, she points out, that securitisation theory omits cases where speaking about security issue (which is one of the fundamental assumption of the early theory) brings further insecurity. All above broadly discussed in the literature of which main developments I present in following sections as the theory has been in development since 1998.

In what Wæver (2004) considers to be the 'Paris school', academics including Didier Bigo, Anastassia Tsoukala, Ayse Ceyhan, and Elspeth Guild go further in their study of security and securitisation than the Copenhagen scholars. They build on post-

structuralist tradition of Foucauldian ‘theory of governmentality’, which is how security is understood – as the way governments craft policies and manage insecurities (migrants, organised crime) by applying various restrictions. Furthermore, they tap into Bourdieu’s ‘theory of field’ (Bourdieu, 1982), where the field is a constellation of actors focused around common cause and power relations between them, as well as ways (practices) in which threats and measures to tackle them are produced. Interestingly, later Copenhagen scholar, Lene Hansen (2006), also points towards practices, rather than speech acts, as sources of securitisation. Moreover, she stresses a role of identities (representations of self and others) that contribute to motives which play a role in securitising practices. The Paris school is criticised by Rita Floyd (2006), who claims that Bigo’s and others’ understanding of security within the Foucauldian framework does not offer any new insights, but rather only propagates Foucault’s theory of government.

The Aberystwyth’s or critical school of security studies, including Andrew Linklater, Ken Booth and Richard Wyn Jones, reflect on the main arguments made by other schools, drawing on the Frankfurt school¹⁰ and Antonio Gramsci’s conceptions of the state and class, focusing on the ways individuals perceive and influence global security, through what Wyn Jones calls ‘emancipation’ (Wyn Jones, 1999).

However, as Balzacq, Leonard and Ruzicka (2016: 498) and Bueger (2015: 5) counterargue, these ‘schools’ have since transformed and become more varied, bringing new academic approaches, critiques and fields of analysis. Below, I briefly outline the various takes on securitisation theory, its main elements, and identify which version of the theory I apply in my research.

Consequently, scholars have discussed the essential theoretical weaknesses of the ‘Copenhagen school’, which led to a development of new terminology and a redefinition of theoretical approaches¹¹.

¹⁰ The Frankfurt School (German: Frankfurter Schule) or the Frankfurt circle - is a school of social theory and philosophy partially associated with the Institute for Social Research at the Goethe University Frankfurt with many important names of social theory like: Jürgen Habermas or Theodor Adorno. Members advanced theory of social change and sought to understand conditions leading to more equal socio-political system based on Karl Marx school of thoughts.

¹¹ Namely: discursive or linguistic (speech acts) opposed to practice focused or non-linguistic (practices); explanatory versus constitutive (normative) and philosophical versus sociological.

The evolving character of theoretical attempts to problematise securitisation outlined above show that there are many theories (rather than one unified theory) of securitisation (Balzacq, Léonard & Ruzicka, 2016: 496). Given this variety, I take recent developments in the discussion as the most mature form, that at the same time settle many of the contradictions. I use a sociological approach in my research, which I outline in detail in the following sub-chapter.

2.2.1 Definitions

The scholarship of securitisation is dominated by voices supporting the sociological approach to the theory.¹² According to Balzacq (2011:3), is:

‘an articulated assemblage of practices whereby heuristic artefacts (metaphors, policy tools, image repertoires, analogies, stereotypes emotions, etc.) are contextually mobilised by a securitising actor, who works to prompt an audience to build a coherent network of implications (feelings, sensations, thoughts and intuitions), about the critical vulnerability of a referent object, that concurs with the securitising actor’s reasons for choices and actions, by investing the referent subject with such an aura of unprecedented threatening complexion that a customised policy must be undertaken immediately to block this development.’

The definition updates earlier concepts of securitisation and its components. Following this approach, it is necessary to define the main terms that build up and complement the definition presented, providing a necessary context to conceptually shift towards a practice-oriented model.

2.2.1.1 Actors

Both Copenhagen and post-Copenhagen commentators recognise actors, or agents, as main components of the securitisation theory. In the classical version, the role of an actor is to perform a securitisation move, that is, to trigger a strategic action by

¹² See: Balzacq (2015); Balzacq, Leonard and Ruzicka (2016), Patomaki (2015), Côté (2016)

announcing a threat (through speech act) and impose exceptional measures in order to secure the threat. The securitising move is seen as a successful if the audience (explained below) accepts it, essentially admitting that the exceptional measures are indeed necessary to deal with the threat.

2.2.1.2 Audience

The central element of securitisation theory is seen to be those who accept the exceptional measures in order to tackle the threat proclaimed by securitising actor. Scholars (Salter, 2008; Leonard & Kaunert, 2011) argue that, in fact, there are several audiences; for example: the public, the elite, the scientific community, amongst which at least one is identified as an enabling (agency). Balzacq (2011: 8-9) differentiates two main functions of these: providing moral support (for example the international community) and formal support, namely through legal instruments or policies (for example by voting). However, the problem of identification persists, because it is not always clear which element of the audience is the enabling one, and through which specific move. The discourse has therefore recently moved towards examining what Balzacq terms as power relations or configurations (2005:172). Indeed, both actors and audiences might possess differing capacities to pose and/or enable an issue as a threat. Moreover, securitising certain issues essentially enables specific actors to gain more power and control, as well as access to a variety of resources that would be inaccessible in a regular cause of action (Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998: 25). This leads to a next important element within which all of the above is included.

2.2.1.3 Context

The Copenhagen school saw a 'context' as a sector- and historical conditions related linked to threat (Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998). Drawing on that, Balzacq, Leonard and Ruzicka (2016: 503) identify context as directly influencing securitisation (for example an event) and macro-scale elements, including, inter alia, social structure, political discourse and institutions as well as practices that influence the way securitisation is perceived and performed. Importantly, the context should not be seen as state-centric, as it can include a variety of social structures and scales – focussing on local practices can explain how securitisation works below the level of

international politics. Historical and cultural discourse performed through language and text as well as cultural practices, equally by audience and actors, is essential to understand the circumstances under which securitisation occurs. As such, it is not a duly planned and scrutinised process, but one where those involved inform each other's discourses within a given historical and cultural perspective and reinforce the message of a threat by constantly negotiating its meaning (Balzacq, Leonard & Ruzicka: 504).

2.2.1.4 *Practices*

Balzacq (2011) outlines three assumptions of how the concept should be read. Firstly, the centrality of audience and its agency - the audience is not merely an executor of the securitising actor's move, but it has the power to reject it, and hence render it unsuccessful. Secondly, the co-dependency of agency and context, where linguistic content (including text) can modify the context, which in turn modifies the content, dipping into both the historical and cultural circumstances. Importantly, there can be multiple audiences and contexts that inform or merge with each other, depending on their capacity and power. Thirdly, analysing securitisation as an unplanned process, we can observe processes running underneath the discursive surface and enacted through instruments, predominantly policies and laws (Balzacq, 2011: 15).

Put differently, securitisation can be carried out with the help of laws, policies or unwritten norms, which enable development of a security regime. These routinised practices are explained through Bourdieu's *habitus*, that is, embodied rules and historical experiences within specific 'field' where power relations are negotiated (Bourdieu, 1977: 159). In the security context, *habitus* is seen as the way threat is thought of, understood and tackled by security practitioners (police or government); for example, how poaching as crime is understood and addressed. The second term, *dispositif* (dispositive) is a 'heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions – in short, the said as much as the unsaid' (Foucault, 1980: 194).

In other words, *dispositif* is a conglomerate of institutions, laws and other administrative rules as well as knowledge about a certain issue through which power

is maintained; for example, how poaching is defined legally, scientifically and morally. Lastly, it is the ones who practice certain institutional arrangements and laws, but equally the positions of power between them.

This process can be captured by mentioned concept of the field, understood as a dynamic collective of actors, and simultaneously, the positions in which they are related to each other. The field is constituted by agents (governments, non-governmental organisations, experts or academics) who share ways of generating knowledge and strategies to solve certain problems, which, in general, are understood as ‘regimes of practices’. These agents stay in certain power positions relative to each other, based on accumulated power (symbolic, cultural, economic or bureaucratic) as well as based on their identity (state or non-state).

2.2.1.5 Desecuritisation

Neumann (2012) and Hansen (2012) addressed lack of specific criteria of a desecuritisation process. He points out that it is not simply a ‘negation of security’ as it does not offer any understanding of how such speech act would be produced (Neumann, 2012: 19). The security context does not simply diffuse itself, but it is rather transformed into less or more institutionalised regimes. First being violisation, where securitised issue falls into outbreaks of direct violence, the second being defined as diplomatisation, where the issue is becoming stabilised through diplomatic channels and peace governance logic.

2.2.2 Conclusion

The above outlined approach allows us to bridge different takes on the theory, where the subjects of analysis are no longer discursive or non-discursive acts of specific actors, but aforementioned ‘regimes of practices’ that can be changed through securitising moves. Habitus and dispositif are important in the correct definition of regimes of practices. As such, field provides the habitus with a context, where power is constituted through instruments, like policies and laws (Balzacq, Leonard & Ruzicka, 2016: 504-507). Therefore, in this thesis I focus on practices as main items of analysis, briefly introducing the context and agents (actors and audience).

With the use of securitisation theory as presented above, I address an essential gap in understanding of practices of securitisation occurring in South Africa in relation to a response of illegal hunting of rhinos and their conservation. The narrative of threat and extraordinary measures that it should be addressed with – an openly declared security approach that emerged within the last decade, resulting in myriads of policy instruments to tackle the crime, but without clarity on effective measures of successful eradication of it. With context-specific, historical and power relations – gives us grounds to assume that securitisation theory applicable, as it addresses all the above elements and places them in a fresh context. It enables a better interpretation of the aims of those involved in the process, as well as the timeline and the context, impossible to address through traditional security studies which does not capture dynamic and power-oriented analysis of a phenomenon. Furthermore, by doing so, it can serve as an instrument with which to dissect elements that trigger the process. It, in turn, gives a perspective on the future of securitised elements.

In the next chapter, I outline the situation of anti-poaching efforts in South Africa through the lens of securitisation theory, identifying main themes to be analysed based on the research material and discussion in the outcome section.

2.3 Methodology

2.3.1 Introduction

This subchapter explains methodological approach to the research on securitisation and framework it employs. Based on the theoretical chapter, where I explained various theoretical avenues the theory of securitisation (or as mentioned – theories) can take in order to fully explore the researched case. In this line I adopt Balzacq multidimensional methodological approach that I explain below.

2.3.2 Assumptions

In this thesis, I apply a structurationist understanding of social context, where individuals or groups actions cannot be analysed without including their socio-cultural context (structure), because practices, individuals and groups inform social structure, and the same time, structure informs individual's behaviour. In this sense structure is a medium and outcome of practices (Giddens, 1979: 5).

2.3.3 Limitations

Informed by paradigmatic approach I fully recognise the limitations coming from this understanding of the social phenomena. As white Eastern European, despite of rich sociocultural experience across the continent, I acknowledge that, despite my best efforts, my understanding of historical, social and cultural facts about South Africa are limited because of my positionality. Similarly, I acknowledge, that my understanding of political phenomena that I aim to analyse might be a subject to such culturally sided analysis. To avoid cultural biases in the analysis I have decided to apply a research methodology that avoid direct fieldwork which would require much deeper and long-term preparation to the sites. An analysis of collected material ensures various data sourcing to avoid epistemic biases.

2.3.4 Research question

The sphere of conservation across Africa has been undergoing some significant changes in the way the response to certain threats is being articulated and exercised. Within the last two decades, several countries in the region introduced methods that qualify as counter-insurgency strategies (Duffy, 2016). The most commonly described examples include growing militarisation of national parks and reserves' forces due to increasing numbers of poached animals, including rhinoceros and elephants. I aim to focus specifically on the response to rhino poaching for the following reasons: firstly, South Africa is home to almost 80 per cent of this animal's global population. Secondly, since 2010, statistics on illegal hunting (discussed in detail in the following chapter) across South Africa raised international concern about ways in which the species should be protected. Thirdly, in the space of one decade, the discourse of trafficking and hunting changed from conservation and habitat protection to being security based, and the phenomena has been redefined as a poaching crisis, a threat to survival – a national priority crime. These are identified as serious organised, commercial crimes as well as serious corruption and those requiring specialised skills (South African Police Service Act, 68 of 1995).

The number of policies and strategies dealing with rhino poaching specifically (aside from conservation and management) has exceeded the number of strategies in place for other endangered species considered.¹³ International interest in protection of this animal (along with elephant) go beyond interests in several other species, like pangolins or cycads.

The rhinoceros is one of the most expensive animals due to estimated maintenance and security costs (African Rhino Range States' African Rhino Conservation Plan [ARCP], 2016: 35)¹⁴, but it is still considered profitable due to its horn having a commodity status. Drawing on the available materials, I contend that elements of a securitised approach can be identified due to high value of the animal derivatives on black market, high poaching statistics and attractive financial profits for state and non-state actors. As Massé and Lunstrum argue, in Mozambique: 'anti-poaching strategies translate into the creation of new securitized wildlife frontiers that dispossess already

¹³ Such as cycads, elephants and pangolins.

¹⁴ Estimated between \$1,125 to as much as \$10,000 per rhino annually

vulnerable communities and concentrate capital in private hands', wherein states deliberately delegate authority to private actors and security companies (2016: 236).

Applying the rationale of above concept to South Africa as a main subject of analysis, I consider how the trajectory of a security narrative changes if there are potentially great gains at stake, for example through tourism or the sale of rhino horns. I hypothesise, that various south African actors dilute the issue of the illegal trade in rhino horn and its derivatives by deploying more boots on the ground, which as I will show in the next chapter, such approach have shown little effect. Secondly, plethora of policies and strategies that have provided a convenient tool in international negotiations over effective response to poaching surge and have built upon justifiable means through which poaching can be resolved South African (as oppose to others, less explored avenues, such as resolving the park conservation – land claims conflict).

My interest is focused on these measures and processes that together create what can be called the securitisation of the conservation and anti-poaching response to illegal hunting and trafficking of rhinoceros' horn, including derivatives. More interestingly, I ask what is the potential interest in securitising the response: is it just a flawed case of production of bureaucracy with genuine will, but lack of enforcement skills? As specified in previous sections, there is a growing body of literature analysing various versions of securitisation across a range of countries, but what is missing is a comprehensive picture of the nature and measures applied in South Africa.

2.3.5 Framework of analysis

Aiming to comprehensively answer my research question within the theoretical framework, there are many avenues through which I could have taken my response. Taking into account securitisation literature, a standard method of conducting the research would be through discourse analysis (Balzacq, 2011: 31). The method is defined as studying social phenomena understood as linguistic (including textual) and non-linguistic forms of expression that carry meaning, assumptions and power relations and helps to uncover them (Hardy, Harley & Phillip, 2004: 19). The power relations between objects or their ordering are linked to the fact that discourses produce and distribute relations (power) between subjects, objects (people or institutions) and as such, they are inherently political (Laffey& Weldes, 2004: 28).

Considering the variety of theoretical approaches to securitisation, Balzacq (2011: 52) suggests, there should be a number of methods available for analysis such as case studies, ethnography, process tracing and content analysis, that are potentially helpful in grasping various angles and levels of securitisation processes and may not be uncovered if one is limited only to discourse analysis. For instance, the idea of a threat central to the securitisation case, defined through any of the above methods or a combination of them, can provide a comprehensive picture of what a given threat is and how it is occurring.

In keeping with the ‘reflexive pluralism’ proposed by Balzacq and explained above, I aim to analyse selected material through discourse, document and content analysis, my approach to the latter two of which I explain below.

Scholars (Prior, 2008; Bowen, 2009) propose document analysis as a way of looking at paper and electronic sources of information as social facts. Having their own agency (Prior, 2008: 824), documents are merely ‘[...] containers of content, but [...] active agents in episodes of interaction and schemes of social organization.’ Here, similarly to practice theorists, documents are seen as tools that carry and enable given practice or practices. In this sense, using document analysis in this work is important for two reasons: firstly, they are used in analysis as having their own agency as tools (functional resource approach); secondly, they are used to organise development of knowledge and practices (archaeological approach) (Prior, 2008: 825).

Put differently, practice theorists analyse through ‘field of practices’, exercised within and through dispositif and through agents’ habitus, in order to securitise the threat. Indeed, some scholars argue, that ‘[m]ore qualitative forms of content analysis that do not assume highly stable meanings of words but, rather, include a sensitivity to the usage of words and the context in which they are used are compatible with discourse analysis and can, in fact, be used within a broad discourse analytic methodology in the analysis of social reality’ (Hardy, Harley & Philips, 2004: 20).

Naturally, discursive analysis is traditionally understood as a separate method¹⁵. Indeed, Laffey & Weldes (2004: 29) see discourse analysis and content analysis as

¹⁵ Wood and Kroger (2001) in Hardy, Harley and Phillips (2004: 20) read discourse analysis as a methodology; founded of social constructivist epistemology, they argue that social reality is actively constructed, rather than uncover, hence ‘[t]he study of the social thus becomes the study of how the objects and concepts that populate social reality come into being’

incompatible: discourse analysis is about ‘power and politics’ while content analysis focusses on patterns in documents, on ‘identifying content units (words, themes, stories and the like) and their clustering [...]’ Hopf (2004), admits that content analysis can be treated as an element of more rigorous discourse analysis by treating the analysed reality much more broadly, so not only through produced texts, but also through meanings that these texts produced.

Hence, to summarise the discussion on methods, I treat certain narratives occurring in different moments of space and time as part of the regimes of practices that are situated within a power relation to each other, both in space and time. For example, a government policy could be directed to a certain audience to produce a specific action (strict conservation zones), but these can be interpreted differently through time and other actors (militarised approaches in strict conservation zones are violating human rights discussed by researchers and media) which in turn produce a reaction (enhanced policy including community conservation) that seeks overwriting the critiqued practice.

2.3.6 Levels of analysis

Given the variety of elements in the analysis of securitisation, it is important to identify those that are relevant. The three main levels offered by Balzacq (2009: 64) provide a useful framework, namely, agents, context and acts.

2.3.6.1 *Agents*

This layer of analysis tackles actors and audiences involved in securitisation: those who act as contributors or resisters, power relations of actors identified, personal and social identities that enable or limit actors, and finally what is threatened (referent object) and the threat (referent subject); that is, in case of my research, the rhinoceros population and poachers or transnational organised crime syndicated responsible for rhino poaching. This level equally concerns the audience. As indicated in the previous chapter, in light of regimes of practices, it is sometimes difficult to name actors and audience, as both may ‘pose or enable threat’ (Balzacq, 2005: 172). However, it is

important to note, that the audience (as a distinctive feature) has two functions: providing moral and formal support.

2.3.6.2 Context

A strategic component of the trio that provides a comprehensive picture of securitisation. The securitisation of the anti-poaching response and conservation agenda for rhinoceroses in South Africa is seen socially and historically. Balzacq distinguishes two contexts: proximate (meetings, summits, interviews), understood as a setting, and distal – embracing the sociocultural dimension of the text (in this case, an intersection of class and race of people who are being suspected of poaching versus those who are seen as trophy hunters).

The above three aspects can be then seen as functional or ontological (Balzacq, 2011: 37). The first would imply the ‘how’ questions in analysis (for example, practices or storylines). The second – question ‘who’ (agents or power) and ‘what’ (idea or the map of the world offered). Context would emerge by answering questions of ‘where’ and ‘when’?

Data triangulation in provided settings will be limited to comparing narratives of different actors claiming certain agencies within analysed context. Namely, I will be comparing governmental sources and narratives with those presented by what can be called independent ones – press articles, non-governmental organisations working with certain communities.

2.3.6.3 Practices

All discursive and non-discursive practices used by actors to succeed, *dispositif* (practices and tools) and policies that are effects of securitisation, including language, frames constructed (analogies, metaphors, stereotypes and others), *dispositif* (a system of mechanisms in social body (or institution) which maintains or enhances the power of that body through institutional, physical, and administrative mechanisms and knowledge structures) and policies that are effects of securitisation. Finally, specific outcomes generated by the process, namely – laws, policies and strategies. Keeping the method in mind, I intend to use practice as a unit of analysis and regimes

or field of practices as clusters of practices. Hence, using the scheme outlined by Balzacq (2009: 64) I will principally be examining how specific practices have been used to securitise the anti-poaching response in South Africa. By identifying answers to questions from the practice perspective, I will specifically be looking at:

- Who has been involved in securitising acts and how?
- What are these acts? Why are they generated?
- What are the tools used or produced?
- What are power relations between those involved and in what way do they influence the narrative?
- What is the idea (map) of the world offered and by whom?

The final question will be answered after the analysis has taken place: to what extent can the process of securitisation can be pronounced as successful and for whom?

As mentioned above, the main focus will be on practices. These will be studied as separate cases creating milestones that flag the most important points of the process identified during the research.

2.3.7 Sources and timeframe

The research includes sources that provide more comprehensive ideas or stories on the one hand, whilst enabling triangulation of data, where various sources will be used verify information and build the fuller picture of selected practices on the other.

Data sources are clustered into seven main categories:

- South African government and its agencies' documents referring to conservation and poaching. This includes the Department of Environmental Affairs, South African Parks, South African Police Service, and especially the Directorate of Priority Crime;
- Parliamentary Monitoring Group, Portfolio Committee of Environmental Affairs;
- Media – publications, briefs, reports, articles, op-eds, videos and movies in online and traditional press/TV that refer to rhino poaching in South or Southern Africa;
- Investigative journalism reports and books;
- UN agencies' reports, briefs and similar resources addressing wildlife crime, with special focus on poaching in South Africa;

- Institute and think tank publications commenting on poaching and security;
- Non-governmental organisations and other bodies' (local and international) projects, reports, statistics and research reports on rhino poaching and responses to it;
- Academic research;
- South African court cases on rhino conservation and related matters.

The timeline selected for the analysis of data stretches from 2010 to August 2017. This is dictated by analysis of the security narrative that gained currency in Sub-Saharan African conservation circles shortly after poaching statistics became concerning (Duffy, 2016: 24; Milliken, 2014: 16).

In the following chapter I apply the explained method and present research outcomes in a framework indicated above. The general outline and context of security discourse in South Africa is explained from national and international perspective in what is combined into the field of practices performed by main agents involve in various power relations.

2.4 Conclusions

In this chapter I explained different research venues of the securitisation theory and argued that it a valuable contribution to the studies on phenomena and mechanisms that are observed in todays' South African conservation and anti-poaching approaches. As a wide field itself, I provided the most relevant elements f the theory that will be applied in further parts of this thesis and proposed a methodology that is a consequence of this theoretical approach. Given variety of methods proposed I argued that with this theoretical lens, a wide definition of the discourse analysis should be applied, that is one where documents are part of the discourse and should be then analysed within. Because I will be specifically focusing on rhino poaching responses in South Africa I provide a term case study to limit the research field. Finally, in methodological section I provide a framework of analysis that underscore three distinctive elements in exploring the securitisation case: the context, agents (actors and audience) and practices that create various discourses and assemblages, underpinned by politics of power. In the following chapter I give a detailed analysis of these three elements that are presented in time-bounded descriptive paragraphs that

explain developing character of the security processes, which I argue, have been applied in case of rhino anti-poaching response in South Africa.

CHAPTER 3 - ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

3.1 Introduction

In this part, I substantiate arguments on the development of a security narrative around rhino conservation and the anti-poaching agenda in South Africa with three subsections outlining elements of the analysis. I explain the context, agents (actors and audience) and finish with a description of security practices through which the response to the rhino survival threat was securitised between 2010 and 2017. I further discuss one of impacts of this development and its complicity in practices of neoliberal conservation, namely differing forms of green grabbing, in the case of South Africa. I conclude this chapter with a list of research findings.

3.2 Overview and context

Inquiring into a multifaceted problem of wildlife poaching and trafficking globally, with many species of animals and plants critically endangered due to illicit activities, I chose to study a case of an animal of which horns and, to a lesser extent, other body parts are trafficked across countries and continents on a great scale (Emslie et al., 2012: 2-4). The interest behind the inquiry is on the one hand dictated by the fact that South Africa has the highest number of rhinos in the world, and on the other, that the animal which became a national symbol and source of pride also created its biggest challenge. The two species of African rhinoceros (and subspecies) inhabit 11 countries of the continent with a white rhino population estimated at around 20,378 and black rhino with population of 5,250. Of that number, almost 80 per cent¹⁶ are concentrated in South Africa with approximately 20,000 or fewer animals¹⁷. Between

¹⁶ Asian populations of rhinoceros are estimated at less than 3,700 across three subspecies: greater one-horned, Sumatran and Javan rhino. See (Emslie et al., 20122016)

¹⁷ The recent report from the IUCN Species Survival Commission (IUCN SSC) African and Asian Rhino Specialist Groups and TRAFFIC to the CITES Secretariat pursuant to Resolution Conf. 9.14 (Rev. CoP15) prepared for the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) 17th Conference of the Parties (CoP17) concluded that as of 2015 the numbers of white southern rhino was estimated for 18,413 and black for 1,893 in South Africa. However,

6,649 and 7,830 white rhinos and 349 – 465 black rhinos (Molewa, 2017a) lived in Kruger National Park in 2016. More than 30 per cent of the South African population belongs to private owners. About 0,5 per cent is managed by communities (Ferreira, 2016). Amongst 11 range states¹⁸, four had the species reintroduced and two introduced (Emslie and Brooks, 1999). Rhinos, along with almost 3,600 other species, are protected by CITES, which prohibits the international trade of horns and derivatives since 1977¹⁹. In 2013, South Africa proposed legalisation of the rhino horn trade and its derivatives, but in 2016, the government decided to withdraw their proposal. A sudden spike in poaching in 2008 was met with growing concerns from international environmental and intergovernmental organisations as well as the South African government. During this time, the Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) explored various solutions to curb rhino poaching, which has been advocated by several scholars.²⁰

3.2.1.1 Understanding the poaching phenomenon

The main reason behind the rhino becoming an endangered species²¹ was unsustainable hunting in the colonial and post-colonial era. However, the numbers of animals being poached (or illegally hunted) within the last decade raised concerns over their protection. South Africa's numbers of poached animals within the last 17 years show how illegal hunting trends developed. In 1990 statistics were low, but incidents of rhinos being killed for their horns started to rise significantly in 2008, when they twice exceeded the total poached in the previous year. The biggest loss in

Hübschle (2016a) provides lower number – 19,700 of both species, based on communication with one of the authors of above report.

¹⁸ Botswana, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

¹⁹ CITES appendices provide regulation for international trade in species that are considered endangered according to various standards, protecting about 35,600 species. There are three appendices, which contain lists of animals considered and voted by parties (182 countries and European Union) requiring specific protection. The decision is made based on available data and reports prepared on that occasion. Parties meet every three years during the conference (CoP) to discuss and vote. CITES also consists of a Standing Committee. The Convention participates in the broader stream of activities aiming to curb illegal trade and is engaged in several networks and projects.

²⁰ See for example Biggs et al. (2013)

²¹ According to IUCN RED List the former has a status of 'near threatened', while the latter is 'critically endangered' (IUCN, 2017)

animals was recorded in 2014, but subsequently decreased between 2015 and the first half of 2017 (Emslie et al., 2016). Researchers²² explored ways in which nineteenth century colonial laws enabled hunting for the privileged, while prohibiting such activity to local populations (unless as a support) under the guise of environmental protection or to force them into labour: '[s]trategies to prevent Africans from hunting include(d) the condemnation of Africans as poachers' with a deeper rooted assumption: that the pristine wilderness should be protected from irrational and uncontrollable local populations (Ramutsindela, 2003:43), through what is termed 'enclosure' (Corson and MacDonald, 2012). Within this understanding, trophy hunting was seen as a 'proper hunting' if performed by colonisers (Adams, 2004: 31)

Arising from such understanding of nature protection is idea of wildlife seen as a part of global commons. Conservationists, activists and cause-driven movements call on arms to protect 'our' rhinos, elephants or wildlife in general. The majority of supporters or headquarters are based in Western Europe or North America²³, but South African home-grown groups are also active.²⁴

Legally, poaching of rhinos is considered a National Priority Crime since 2011 (Molewa, 2013) and includes a range of 'restricted activities involving listed threatened or protected species under National Environmental Management: Biodiversity (NEMBA, 2004), including Threatened and Endangered Species (TOPS, 2007) regulations²⁵ and South African law under the Prevention of Organised Crime Act (POCA, 1998)²⁶. Activities most commonly mentioned as offences include: illegal hunting, possession of firearms, trespassing, intent to commit a crime or possession of rhino horns (DEA 2017a).

²² Inter alia Ellis (1994), Neumann (2004), Ramutsindela (2006), Essen (2016), Hubschle (2016b), however the field of analysis is much wider. See for instance the paragraphs on political ecology in Chapter 1.

²³ See Save the Rhino (n.d.), Born Free Foundation (n.d.) or Wild Aid (n.d.) for example.

²⁴ Such as the Outraged South African Citizens Against Rhino Poaching (OSCAP)

²⁵ in line with sections: 56, 57, 97, 98, 102 of NEMBA (2004), TOPS: Amendment Regulations (2008) and Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) Regulations regarding prohibition of international trade (2010)

²⁶ As underlying offences that trigger the applicability of money laundering, in line with section 4, 5, 6 and 8.




Chart 1: Poaching Statistics 2000 - 2017 (NSSSRSA, 2010 & DEA, 2017a)

The United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP, n.d.) notes that wildlife crime ‘is not defined in any treaty, but is understood to refer to any environment related crime that involves the poaching, capture, collection or processing of animals and plants taken in contravention of national laws, and any subsequent trade in such animals and plants, including their derivatives or products’ (McLellan et al., 2014: 2)

In 2010, CITES Secretariat, United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC, n.d.), INTERPOL-ICPO (n.d.), World Bank (n.d.) and World Customs Organisation (WCO, n.d.) established the International Consortium on Combating Wildlife Crime (ICCWC, n.d.), a network that has defined and steered the international agenda in, inter alia, rhino poaching and trafficking of parts²⁷. The network stresses the transnational character of groups involved in rhino poaching and stresses effective law enforcement as one of the main factors in tackling the crime. The main challenge of such an understanding is rooted in various incoherent national level legal arrangements.

Poaching and trafficking of rhino horn and other body parts has been widely analysed²⁸ and is seen as a multifaceted issue that is an intersection of complex international markets flows between demand (China, Vietnam), transfer (Europe, African and South Asian countries), and supply countries (South Africa is seen as one

²⁷ Organisations established separate units concerning wildlife crime in the remit of their work

²⁸ See for example: Eloff and Lemieux (2014), Essen, 2016, Hübschle (2016), Nurse (2016), Milliken (2014), Rademeyer, (2016), Aucoin and Donnenfeld (2017)

of the hotspots). Main reasons include market demand from countries like China or Vietnam as a ‘traditional medicine’ or as a commodity (UNODC, 2016). Secondly, the problem is analysed as a transnational organised crime as regards criminal networks that are involved in such procedures. Finally, it is seen as a social phenomenon in that it provides analysis of social (and closely related economic) motivations including what Hübschle (2016a: 50) labels as ‘contested illegality’ – a perception of legal arrangements (national, global) as being not valid (and so contested) applying equally to demand, transit and supply countries, where different arguments would be used to contest the illegality of the trade. As an underlying issue, it explains corruption and challenges in efficient law enforcement. Although of great importance, the motive and drivers of rhino derivate trafficking are not the subject of this thesis, hence it will not be analysed in detail.

3.2.1.2 South Africa’s journey to protect rhinos

Efforts to re-establish critically endangered populations of different subspecies of rhino have been generally successful. From mid-1995, the country saw steady growth in numbers. In 2007, DEA installed the TOPS regulations that provided specific measures under which trade and hunting of, inter alia, rhinos, was allowed (TOPS: 2007). Year later, the Moratorium on Rhino Horn (National Environmental Management Biodiversity Act (10/2004): Notice in terms of section 57 (2), 2009) or the ‘blanket ban’ was proposed for public consultation and promulgated in 2009, effectively closing the domestic rhino horn market. The decision came relatively quickly, considering the reports on rising numbers of poached animals, but knowledge of illegal hunting was not new. Rising numbers of incidents concerned the Kruger National Park authorities as early as mid-1990, with data going back to 1986 (Maggs & Greef, 1994).

In light of the 1994 transformation, South Africa’s anti-poaching forces also changed: late 1980s investigations into environmental crime were part of the Endangered

Species Protection Unit (ESPU) (Gosling, 2002)²⁹ with a well-developed network of informants. After a dismantling in 2002, staff were retributed across smaller police stations in the country with only few finding employment in the Directorate of Special Operations (DSO), or Scorpions, reporting to the National Prosecution Authority (NPA) and Department of Justice (DoJ). Although extremely effective³⁰, they were disbanded in 2008 after a merger with South African Police Services - a move that the public saw as being a way to undermine investigations into corruption of African National Congress (ANC) officials, the ruling party since 1994 (Mail & Guardian, 2008) and eventually replaced by the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigations (DCPI), also known as Hawks. The unit is delegated to investigate rhino poaching and trafficking with much lower conviction rate³¹.

Shortly after, in 2010, the DEA introduced the National Strategy for Safety and Security of Rhinoceros in South Africa (NSSSRSA), that proposed protection and law enforcement strategies (DEA, 2010). The operational side was mainly delivered by Environmental Management Inspectors while Hawks were responsible for carrying out investigations. Simultaneously, an interim National Wildlife Crime Reaction Unit (NCWRU) was created, co-managed by SANParks (Molewa, 2011). In the meantime, poaching statistics swelled to 333 animals killed that year across all park facilities. Exploring more comprehensive conservation strategies, in October 2010, during the Rhino Summit, the DEA agreed to appoint a feasibility study committee aiming to research the viability of the legal rhino horn trade. In the aftermath of the report (Taylor et al., 2014), an Inter-Ministerial Committee decided to sustain current policies and uphold the trade ban (Molewa, 2016a). Public deliberation held in 2015 allowed opponents and proponents of the trade to express their dissatisfaction with

²⁹ Within 13 years of operation, before wildlife crime became a growing issue, the unit at the time investigated 1,220 cases, made 1,668 arrests, confiscated 14 tonnes of ivory and 546 rhino horns and 46 tonnes of marine products, like abalone and thousands of rare plants, birds and reptiles (Reeve, 2002)

³⁰ DSO has a high success rate (over 90%) based on the number of prosecutions to number of convictions; in the final year of operations, the unit convicted 171 out of 182 prosecutions (NPA, 2008)

³¹ However, according to National Prosecution Agency, the conviction rates are high. This can be explained by the fact that the Agency defines conviction rate as percentage of wildlife crime cases where prosecuted were convicted compared to number of prosecutions. In other words, arrests that did not led to prosecutions were not included in the equation. For example, in 2015 number of poached animals reached 1175 and 317 people were arrested. From this number only 54 people were prosecuted and 48 convicted. If we take two last numbers, then the conviction rate is high. If we compare arrests to conviction, the percentage equals 15 points (Verwoerd, 2016)

the ban, that, according to them, caused the trade to go underground (DEA, 2015b). This view is contested as ignoring semi-legal trade before the ban, and routes and operations leading to illegal rhino horn trade (Hübschle, 2016a: 299).

A year later, in January 2011, interim NCWRU started to cooperate on rhino poaching investigations with the National Joint Operation Structure (NATJOINTS) (SAPS, 2011) and eventually ceased activity a year later. NATJOINTS has been responsible for developing strategic responses to security threats related to immigration, service delivery protests since 2010, when they were assembled secure operations around 2010 World Cup (Omar, 2010). Due course the responsibility expanded to environmental crimes like poaching, which was declared a national priority crime in 2011. There is no clarity as to which legislation or regulations mandate the establishment and activities of the body (Flanagan, 2016) or why police, intelligence and military are being merged into one organism - NATJOINTS (Duncan, 2014), to address environmental crimes. Logistically, NATJOINTS is coordinated by the Hawks (Molewa, 2013). The 'structure' also involves South Africa National Defence Forces (SANDF), who, since 2011 (Martin, 2011) have been deploying soldiers in Kruger National Park (Department of Defence [DoD], 2011). Further governmental agencies involved in the 'priority committee on rhino poaching' are: Revenue Services (SARS), State Security Agency (SSA), the national Park Authority, Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), Veterinary Services, Medicines Control Councils (MCC), Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF), SANParks, and DEA.

While NATJOINTS were focussing on interventions in most affected area, Kruger National Park, in the following two years, another bold move to curb poaching was made. In late 2012, General (Retired) Johan Jooste became a head of anti-poaching unit for 22 South African national parks. In a famous inaugural statement, he declared war on foreign nationals who poach rhinos in South Africa (SANParks, 2012). At that point, poaching statistics reached new levels – by the end of the year, 668 animals were poached. Not long after, in 2014, in support of provincial governments, the Cabinet approved the Integrated Strategic Management Approach (ISMA) for rhinoceros (Molewa, 2014a) to better address management issues. That was a change from previous Rhino Issue Management³² - a set of consultations with public, private

³² Although sound and comprehensive in content, it did not propose any coordinated solution. See Rhino Issue Management Report (DEA, 2013)

rhino, land and reserve owners as well as the non-governmental sector. The approach (ISMA) covers four main areas of activities: compulsory interventions (anti-poaching measures); increasing rhino populations, international cooperation and long-term sustainability measures. The interventions were to be implemented by ‘security cluster’ (NATJOINTS)³³. Moreover, as a part of the new approach, the Minister announced the creation of the Intensive Protection Zone (IPZ) in the southern part of the Kruger National Park. 4000 square kilometres, roughly a one fifth of the entire protected area, was a result of a R 255 million donation from the Howard G. Buffet Foundation in March 2014 (Joubert, 2015). It is worth noting that the IPZ is just one of three zones created in KNP: Composite Protection Zone (CPZ) shared with Mozambique and Joint Protection Zone (JPZ) involving Rangers United, communities, concession zone protection services (a buffer zone on the Mozambican side of the GLC) as well as Mozambican rangers’ units (Figure 1). A patchwork of various units and approaches comprises of surveillance and canine units to community-based approach with correspondingly varied armament.

Meanwhile, NATJOINTS drafted a law enforcement arm of ISMA – the National Integrated Strategy to Combat Wildlife Trafficking (NISCWT, 2017). The document reiterated wildlife crime, including poaching, as a national security threat but also stressed the whole society approach, including ‘communities’ as an effective way to combat poaching and trafficking. In November 2015, President Zuma further grounded the narrative by announcing to five thousand local community members that, ‘[s]aving the rhino may ultimately save all our communities from poverty, increased crime and suffering’ (DEA, 2015c). On the ground, the long-prepared Anti-Poaching Unit (APU) was ready for deployment:

‘The air wing, canine unit and special rangers were expanded and appropriate technologies acquired. The air and ground mobility was [sic!] enhanced and the capacity for night operations improved. This capability was deployed on a well thought out zoning approach to address the right priority areas at any one time. The investment started

³³ NATJOINTS is one of the seven operational teams of the Justice, Crime Prevention and Security (JCPS) Cluster, or in short, the ‘security cluster’. The body gathers ministries of Justice and Correctional Services, Defence, Home Affairs, Police, and State Security. It aims to, inter alia, fight corruption and crime and provide strategic guidance on related issues (Naidoo & Makananisa, 2017)

paying off and during that year rhino poaching figures could be stabilized for the first time since the start of the scourge'. (PMG, 2017)




Figure 1: Zoning in Kruger National Park (Funda, 2016)

On the information front, Minister Molewa ran several media briefings in 2015, aiming to promote the approach and successes that were to come with heavily armed ranger units and a security cluster as the brain of the operation. In statements, she was often joined by representatives from the cluster, also involved in presenting data on poaching or progress on the ‘rhino issue’ (Molewa, 2016c). This suggest that DEA was either pushing for co-accountability of the issue with agencies better equipped to tackle it or, that the department was seen by security actors as not capable to manage the issue. A process that initially stemmed from lack of legal tools evolved into political and financial over-focus on the issue. Direct references to national and human security allowed a foundation for successful narratives on poachers and kingpins as

main perpetrators to be laid. These personified carriers of a threat have been used to unlock international funds allocated to combating wildlife crime and justify neoliberal conservation. A year later, ahead of the CITES Conference of Parties (COP17) in Johannesburg, DEA announced African Rhino Range States' African Rhino Conservation Plan (ARCP), a document that reiterated many of the NSSSRSA and ISMA points, calling upon 11 range states for cooperation on effective anti-poaching measures (DEA, 2016d). It has a solidly grounded narrative on poaching, yet there is no recognition of the key issues contributing to the problem, such as corruption and weak governance on provincial levels,³⁴ which points towards distorted idea of the cause of the issue. COP17 participants were also presented the draft NISCWT underscoring the importance of security and elimination of the threat ('CITES CoP17: Untouchable? ...', 2016). However, on a different front a Rhino Laboratory, a one-month meeting in 2016, gathered academics, NGOs and government representatives to deliberate on law enforcement, community engagement, legislation and anti-poaching. The shift from strictly security-based to a broader one can be observed in the documents (DEA, 2016c)³⁵ which I will come to in later sections.

3.2.2 Agents

The rising importance of security as a framework of rhino protection did not occur in a vacuum. The process of securitisation developed in phases and has been reinforced through constant negotiations of power between actors, audiences and alliances of these two around various interests. Narratives change and fluctuate depending on positions of power which agents take. These are negotiated through language and practices. In search of valid response to rhino poaching, main actors and audiences have been aligning themselves to different narratives, of which a prevalent one concerned threat and security, both in language and practices. It has resonated with experiences, identities and imagery of insecurities. White (2014: 459) defines the field of agents as a 'transnational conservation community'. However, the researcher also highlights that a network of actors operates through discursive coalitions which are

³⁴ In 2016 a two-part report from Global Initiative on Transnational Organised Crime, authored by Julian Rademeyer who is involved in the topic through his book, 'Killing for Profit' (2012), named corruption as one of the facilitators of wildlife crime; see Rademeyer (2016).

³⁵ There has been since an update on ISMA and Rhino Lab, see: Rhino Conservation Lab. Progress update report to the Portfolio Committee on Environmental Affairs (DEA, 2017b).

time bound and heterogenous. Indeed, to analyse specific practices, it is necessary to understand the positions of the most significant actors in the field. In the below sections, I explain the agents involved in regimes of practices and continue with explaining such regimes that effected the securitised rhino poaching agenda in South Africa.

3.2.2.1 South African governmental agencies

During the dawn of the ‘poaching crisis’ between 2006 and 2008, the then-Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT) found itself in a questionable situation. Despite installing designated services, poaching statistics had not fallen. The trade ban of the rhino horn trade was the default way for the South African government to respond to the challenge.

The later Department of Environmental Affairs, under the leadership of minister Edna Molewa since 2010, together with NATJOINTS have been main domestic arm in the securitisation process. First, by addressing the critique of South Africa’s rhino poaching response through tapping into the national security narrative, and secondly, by bringing the ‘security cluster’ - a powerful group concerning more than just the conservation of rhino populations. Rooted in formations like ESPU and tapping into apartheid policing methods, like in case of SAPS, the security substrate brought extraordinary measures to combat poachers.

Poaching, seen as a form of environmental crime, was attempted to be tamed through legal ends. The shift from an unregulated domestic market (Hübschle, 2016: 257) to an illegal one set the scene for the subsequent involvement of SAPS, then SANDF, and finally a ‘security cluster’ - NATJOINTS, an incarnation of the Scorpions. Aside from joining forces with security, intelligence and military communities, the domestic budget allocated to anti-rhino interventions has increased more than tenfold (Table 1).

Year	DEA	SANPARKS	TOTAL
2008/09	0	0	0
2009/10	0	0	0
2010/11	0	0	0
2011/12	R 3 000 000	R 2 000 000	R 5 000 000
2012/13	R 8 000 000	R 8 000 000	R 16 000 000
2013/14	R 10 000 000	R 8 000 000	R 18 000 000
2014/15	R 10 600 000	R 33 480 000	R 44 080 000
2015/16	R 11 000 000	R 33 870 000	R 44 878 000
2016/17	R 11 550 000	R 34 665 000	R 46 215 000
2017/18	R 12 216 000	R 35 448 000	R 47 664 000

Table 1: Department of Environmental Affairs and SANParks budgets allocated to Integrated Strategic Management Plan (PMG, 2015)

3.2.2.2 *Intergovernmental organisations and foreign governments*

UN agencies have played a crucial role in the process of development of environmental security. For the issue of rhino poaching, they brought security through claims of wildlife crime robbing countries from potential income, transnational organised crime (TOC) eroding the rule of law and states' integrity, and finally, suggesting that aside from TOC, poachers and wildlife traffickers are linked to insurgent groups with alleged connections to terrorism (UNODC, 2016: 19).

Of the most prominent, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and UN Environment Programme teamed with INTERPOL to issue various strategic publications, adding to the perception of wildlife as an international organised crime, a threat to national and international stability as well as broader human security (UNODC, 2016: 3). Along with their own agendas, five organisations clustered as ICCWC have been setting the tone in global wildlife crime discussions.

In 2015, UN General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution which set a framework for collective action and coordination against wildlife crime (UNGA, Res. 69/314), which called for a more comprehensive response that also includes protection

of communities and livelihoods.³⁶ Two years later, in late 2017, the 71st UN resolution on wildlife trafficking (UNGA, Res.71/326) reiterated concerns about detrimental levels of rhinoceros poaching and the alarmingly high levels of killings of elephants and called on member states for firmer actions and counter-corruption programmes. Along with resolutions, UN was also a donor and facilitator of projects delivered in various countries on curbing wildlife crime. One of the main financial instruments that supported the anti-poaching response was the World Bank's Global Environmental Facility (GEF). It has subsequently supported many initiatives of which the most important ones were: strengthening law enforcement capabilities (Global Environmental Facility [GEF], 2012; DEA, 2012) including Rhino Programme with the Electronic Rhino DNA Indexing System (Rhino DNA Indexing System [RhODIS], n.d.).

In close collaboration with the UN and World Bank, state governments forged their own agendas that contributed to or defined the poaching and wildlife trafficking security threat. The focus on big mammals, or iconic species, included elephants and rhinos, along with big cats. The most prominent state players include the United States and the United Kingdom. Their actions shaped security practices on the anti-poaching agenda in Sub-Saharan Africa and influenced South Africa's policies as described in subsequent sections.

3.2.2.3 International Organisations

The tone for discussing poaching as a security threat was partially set by international environmental organisations, which includes different legal entities collectively referenced non-governmental organisations (NGO) but equally linked to governments. The International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN, n.d.) has their own Species Survival Commission for African Rhino Specialist Group (AfRGS, n.d.) which, along with the Wildlife Trade Monitoring Network TRAFFIC (n.d.), provided reports on the status of rhino populations for CITES COP17 (2016) that

³⁶ It draws on almost two years of the work of UN Group of Friends on Poaching and Illicit Wildlife Trafficking, co-chaired by Germany and Gabon, and a long series of meeting and international declarations on illegal wildlife trade including the 2013 Paris Declaration, the 2014 London Declaration, the 2015 Kasane Statement and the 2015 Brazzaville Declaration. See Polner & Moell, (2016: 71-2)

contributed to the decision to keep the rhino species on Appendix 1, except for the white rhino population of South Africa and Swaziland.³⁷ In South Africa, the World Wildlife Fund (WWF SA) is known for participation in variety of conservation of projects. The image of this organisation does not come without controversies. The most infamous one was Operation Lock, wherein former president of WWF, Prince Bernard of the Netherlands, assembled a task force of British mercenaries-turned-poachers under the command of a Special Air Service (SAS) veteran in 1980s. SANDF. South African Defence Forces (SADF) and intelligence units were also involved in the operation (Ellis, 1994, Rademeyer, 2012)³⁸. More recently, the organisation, supported by \$5 million grant from Google and Peace Park Foundation (PPF, n.d.) and the Lindbergh Foundation's Air Shepherd (n.d.) programme, launched a drone monitoring trial in KNP (Nuwer, 2017), that has since been proclaimed as unsuccessful (Martin, 2017).

One of the global actors has been the United for Wildlife, a campaign assembling a group of prominent wildlife focus organisations including WWF, Conservation International (CI), Fauna and Flora International (FFI), The Nature Conservancy (TNC), IUCN, Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS), and Zoological Society London (ZSL). Established by Duke and Duchess of Cambridge, or Prince William Windsor and his wife, the organisation's website asks: 'whose side are you on?'. The campaign was part of the London Declaration in 2014 and 'fights poachers' 'on the front line of the fight to save wildlife.' (United for Wildlife, n.d.). For some scholars, an underpinning story that grounded the link in textual contexts was a 2012 Elephant Action League's report (Kalron & Crosta, 2012) that led to establishment the 'poacher-as-terrorist narrative' (Duffy, 2016) where ivory has been dubbed as 'white gold of jihad'.³⁹ A catchy title repeated in numerous further publications involved a terrorist group from Somalia - Al-Shabab – in the ivory nexus and gradually included

³⁷ As we read: 'For the exclusive purpose of allowing international trade in live animals to appropriate and acceptable destinations and hunting trophies. All other specimens shall be deemed to be specimens of species included in Appendix I and the trade in them shall be regulated accordingly' See CITES (2017)

³⁸ The South African branch of WWF was created on the foundation of another organisation – South African Nature Foundation. It was led by Anton Rupert, a good friend of Prince Bernard and founder of Peace Parks Foundation (Büscher & Ramutsindela, 2016: 7)

³⁹ Notably, the organisation re-published the report in 2016 explaining that they never denied more substantial forms of income for Al-Shabab than ivory, suggesting that charcoal (EAL, 2016) as a source of finances, also mentioned in UNEP-INTERPOL report, is much more important. Haenlein, Maguire and Sommerville (2016) debunk the link by analysing flawed sources of connection.

other poached and trafficked species, such as rhinos. The narrative fluctuates in two directions. A poacher- terrorist link recognised as security threat or the human- nature threat withdraws from offering terrorism as one of them. The latter was successfully utilised by conservation organisations by making the problem more relevant and linked to broader issues (White, 2014: 462). More generally, by using the environmental crisis narrative interchangeably with a poaching surge, wildlife crime crisis and similarly emotional appealing formulations of a story of ‘destroyed wilderness’ or ‘butchered animals’, a plethora of organisations have been using a marketing strategy to boost their financial situation in a ‘conservation spectacle’ (Igoe, Neves and Brockington, 2010: 498). Those strategies have also been successfully applied by the private sector (MacDonald, 2010).

A separate group, although organically linked to international organisations and the story they tell, are single or various animal-cause related activists and their supporters clustered in official or non-official movements. They form substantial audience for international organisations. Most prominent include groups whose main activities concern advocating animal rights, ivory or rhino horn bans. They are instituting what is being described by political ecologists, as defenders of wilderness, also actively involved in a production of narrative of a poacher and a necessity of desperate measures to protect ‘our wildlife’.

March for Elephants and Rhinos (n.d.) or Outraged SA Citizens Against Rhino Poaching (OSCAP, n.d.) are just a few examples of such groups. Although mostly restricted to social media messaging and campaigns, they also organise protests and marches to support their cause. They are informed by bigger global conservationists’ organisations, well established in Africa, which target smaller groups and various individuals with emotion-based messages. Because of their unstructured and social media-based character, this group also includes the general public, who voice their opinions via social media and social campaigns, usually based in Western Europe or US, but not exclusively. This segment creates what in securitisation theory is called ‘audience’, as they possess an agency as global customer and ‘trendsetters’ but are equally highly influenced by the narrative created in popular and social media. Programmes such as ‘Battleground: Rhino Wars’ (2013), ‘Ivory Game’ (2016) or ‘Virunga’ (2014) were created for these groups.

3.2.2.4 Private security companies

Organisations providing training and services aiming to secure private reserves and parks. Their range of activities vary from providing training for staff of national parks and aspiring rangers to providing security services to farms and private reserves and engaging in charity work through campaigns promoting a ‘villain – hero’ or ‘poacher – wildlife defender’ narrative (International Anti-Poaching Foundation [IAPF], n.d.). Of the few engaging in work for private game reserves or national parks at some point from 2010 onwards, I name the following: Hemmersbach Rhino Force (HRF, n.d.), Protrack Anti-Poaching Unit (n.d.), Hoedspruit Endangered Species Centre (HESC, n.d.), QUEMIC (n.d.) or Paramount Group (n.d.). The security nexus goes beyond conservation measures such as patrolling and tracking – these charities and private ventures have access to surveillance technologies, arms and vehicles that provide opportunities for profit while protecting game reserves. Massé and Lunstrum (2016: 234) explain how this private-public partnership worked on the Mozambican side of the Great Lebombo:

‘The prominence of these private actors reflects the thoroughly neoliberal way in which Mozambique supports the creation of the GLC as a conservation-security apparatus. First, it has given the reserves’ private security forces a great deal of latitude in their rhino-security efforts including the ability to conduct raids on communities, collect intelligence and engage in surveillance, deploy roadblocks, make arrests, and evict populations.’

Noteworthy, these organisations have often been established by former (and foreign) soldiers that have a little understanding of a socio-cultural realities.

3.2.2.5 Private rhino owners and wildlife ranchers

According to information on the Private Rhino Owners Association (PROA, n.d.) website, there are approximately 330 private game reserves with a total estimated area of 2 million hectares of land that own 35 per cent of the total rhino population in South Africa. Proud of their contribution to preserving the species, members are also prone to benefitting from it. The story of private rhino owners and their involvement in the rhino horn black market has been discussed in variety of sources (Ayling, 2013;

Rademeyer, 2012; Hübschle 2016a). Modus operandi includes primarily laundering rhino horns into the illegal Asian markets thanks to porous borders, corrupted officials, veterinarians and legal loopholes providing a convenient opportunity for a lucrative business to flourish. In 2012, Johan Krüger, one of the biggest rhino breeders in South Africa, lodged a case against DEA's moratorium on rhino horn and amended TOPS regulations (*Krüger & Another v Minister of Water and Environmental Affairs & Others*, 2012). Joined by John Hume, a fellow rhino breeder, they argued, inter alia, that as the biggest rhino breeders in the world, DEA failed to consult them personally and consultations set by the DEA were insufficient). The case was supported by Wildlife Ranching Association and Private Rhino Owners Association of South Africa. After the 2015 verdict overturning the blanket ban, DEA appealed to the Supreme and subsequently to the Constitutional Court. In March 2017, the latter dismissed the application to appeal the decision (Molewa, 2017c). Earlier that year, DEA gazetted draft regulations on rhino horn as a hunting trophy which would allow export of up to two horns for personal purposes abroad. It effectively undermines DEA's rhino conservation intentions (Kotze, 2014a). Pinnock (2017) pointed out several issues with such installed legislation. He argues that personal, and not commercial, purposes are not sufficiently well defined, which creates the potential to illegally trade horns by those who bought or hunted rhino in South Africa. In the light of restored domestic rhino horn trade, John Hume opened the first online rhino horn auction (Rhino Auction, 2017). Actions of this group of actors highlight a lobby that is powerful enough to challenge national legislation and advocate for suitable changes that guarantee high profits.

3.3 Assessing the field of practices: instruments and tools: from conservation to rhino security

3.3.1 The politics of extraordinary - rhino poaching as a threat

Followed by a successful ‘Battle for the Elephants (2013), Animal Planet released their own ‘Battleground: Rhino Wars’ (2013). The series presented a group of American and local security forces combating poaching in Kruger National Park. It is full of images of killed, wounded and vividly mutilated animals, soldier-like men, guns and military technology in the ‘war against poachers’. The narrative, reproduced in a number of articles and media relations, features a clearly-defined hero and villain story, with no grey areas. Besides the EAL’s report linking poaching to terrorism, the transactional conservation community actively contributed to such framing. Intergovernmental agencies drew on their experience with successful discourses on environmental security. Early reports created a dramatic narrative of environmental crime crisis and threat, informing a UNEP-INTERPOL report in which the authors made a link between security and wildlife crime while implying inadequate capacities of the countries affected by the ‘crisis’ to justify the following framing:

‘Legislation on environmental crimes in many countries is under-developed. Sentencing guidelines typically address petty crimes and do not reflect the very serious nature and involvement of organised crime and the impacts it has on environment, economic and social development of the countries and local communities or populations. They do not take into account the sheer scale of loss of resources, money laundering or threats to state security involved.’ (Nellemann et al. 2014: 17).

Another report, the content of which has been quoted in a myriad of sources⁴⁰ is the 2014 ‘UNEP Perspectives Illicit Wildlife Trafficking: Environmental, Economic and Social Issue’ (McLellan et al. 2014). First, the document stated that illicit trade in wildlife had become the fourth biggest commodity worldwide, estimated at \$19

⁴⁰ For example, 2016 UNODC World Wildlife Crime report or Institute for Security Studies Africa in recent ENACT project (Aucoin & Donnenfeld, 2017)

billion annually, after drugs, human trafficking and counterfeiting.⁴¹ The claim was sourced in the US-based Global Financial Integrity (GFI) report by Haken (2011) who gathered the numbers based on variety of sources, including CITES, WWF, TRAFFIC, US State Department-supported Coalition Against Wildlife Trafficking (CAWT), newspaper articles, which referenced CITES and WWF as well as activists (Colombo, 2003). More importantly, the report mentions insurgency groups in Africa⁴², profiting from poaching.

By referencing the scale of illegal business and repeatedly referring to a ‘threat’, the UNEP report created a justification for a special focus on poaching and trafficking. The GFI Managing Director, in testimony to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, wrote about a connection with terrorist group Al-Qaida, along with militias and drug gangs, which together created a threat to U.S. security (Cardamone, 2012). This ‘self-referential practice that does not refer to objective security threats outside itself’ (Floyd, 2008, 58) created strong storyline of a threat that contributed to justification of security solutions to the poaching problem. International interests of foreign governments in the African continent have been strictly aligned with businesses, investments and assistance among many avenues of control. Following the establishment of a security threat (described in following section), the U.S. government’s former secretary of state, Hilary Clinton, upgraded poaching to a national security threat in late 2012 (Goldenberg, 2012). In the same year, by executive order of President Barack Obama, \$10 million was granted (of which \$3 million to South Africa) to combat wildlife trafficking (The White House, 2013). Two years later, the Foreign Affairs Committee passed legislation that ‘strengthen[ed] National Security’ and, among many other points, ‘supports increased professionalization of partner countries’ wildlife law enforcement rangers on the front lines of the fight against poachers, who are often armed with night-vision goggles, heavy weaponry, and even helicopters.’ (Congress of the United States, 2016).

The United Kingdom has been involved in variety of ways. In 2013, the government pledged £10 million to combat wildlife crime. Royal Foundations’ campaign United for Wildlife and their support for the cause shaped an idea of the problem for the UK

⁴¹ In fact, the Haken report provides numbers on wildlife, timber and fisheries that together give number of approximately \$19 billion.

⁴² With names like Indian branch of Al-Qaida, Sudanese Janjaweed and variety of groups from Asia.

and Western European audience. In the London Declaration, concerned governments reiterated international actions and urged affected counterparts to enforce stricter laws, naming rhinos and elephants as most affected species (UK Government, 2014). South Africa was not one of the signatories ('The London Declaration's Role ...', 2014). In the statement, Minister Molewa used the opening session of the parliament as a reason for not attending the event. Reading further into the release, it is clear that South Africa and the UK government disagreed on issues of sustainable use, and that London favoured cessation. This was a signal for the international community that South Africa will not be dictated on their wildlife conservation policies (Molewa, 2014). The minister and the government were delivering their own operations through NATJOINTS and the ISMA, that, on one hand, act as a proof for the international donors of seriousness in which the government is treating poaching and wildlife trafficking, while on the other, provided secrecy over the operations ran, should there be any doubt about effectiveness of operations, the national security was brought to discussion.

It was not long before local and international media reiterated their opinion of the government's strategy as being dubious due to international donations made by international governments (Kotze, 2014b). Although DEA did not accept terms of London declaration, it did accept a joint Swedish and Dutch postcode lottery 'Dear Fund' donation of R232 million (€15.4 million) handed to Peace Parks Foundation for a 'multifaceted, comprehensive programme'⁴³ in the same year. In the PPF announcement post, Archbishop Desmond Tutu called for saving rhinos which 'beautiful Africa' needs (PPF, 2014).

The way the narrative is framed exemplifies the PPF⁴⁴ as being shown as saviours of poached animals and the African wilderness – a mechanism described in literature as 'producing wilderness' (Neumann, 1998; Massé, 2016). Along with PPF and WWF, other smaller non-governmental organisations joined the 'fight against rhino slaughter'. So have been private security companies, specialising in anti-poaching. The message collated is perpetrating a stereotypical view of wild Africa, extension of

⁴³ That comprehensive programme included 'intelligence gathering and technology applications such as conservation drones and other specialist' (Molewa, 2014)

⁴⁴ A portion of funds helped in creating an 'independent' Wildlife Justice Commission, based in The Hague. The organisation successfully investigated several cases of wildlife crime.

rights to influence local anti-poaching activities and impacting both local and national politics by reproducing the colonial and apartheid systems of operations and forcing enclosure (Ramutsindela, 2007; Hübschle, 2016: 321; Annecke & Masubelele, 2016).

The amount of pressure applied by international actors and the money invested into anti-poaching and anti-wildlife trafficking pushed the government to align its message with dominant players. Together with changing policies (NSSSRSA, RIM, ISMA and NISCWT) and attitudes, the language used by South African government agencies involved in anti-poaching strategy has also changed. Between 2010 and 2017 it shifted from poaching being described as an illegal activity towards more specific description of poachers, their links to transnational organised crimes, syndicates and insurgency. Before 2009, the language of media realises of the DEA and parks authorities was emotionally neutral. Early documents concerning rhino protection, such as NSSSRSA, offset facts and figures with emotional messaging. Poaching is used interchangeably with ‘illegal killing’, as in providing early statistics on incidents in across national parks and private reserves. The document mentions ‘involvement of highly organised and well-structured crime syndicates that are operating a lucrative international enterprise’ and ‘leakage’ of South African horns into the illegal international markets from stocks in the public and private sector (NSSSRSA, 2010). The strategy set up an ambitious, comprehensive outline of short and long-term goals, of which some relate to scientific and forensic analysis as well as law enforcement and international cooperation with bodies such as INTERPOL. At that time briefings on poaching were rare, and usually related to poaching statistics.⁴⁵

As indicated in the previous section, between the launch of the Integrated Strategic Management Approach in 2014 and 2017 the security language developed. The shift included more emotional arguments about impoverished communities, comprehensively supported by DEA’s and SANParks’ initiatives, which are at risk of recruitment for poaching activities. Simultaneously, the language became more militarised not only by describing ongoing on-ground militarisation, but employing expressions that denote military jargon, including phrases such as ‘war against poaching’ - ‘criminal gangs are armed to the teeth, well-funded and part of transnational syndicates who will stop at nothing to get their hands-on rhino horn’

⁴⁵ See for example: Update of rhino poaching statistics (DEA, 2012b)

(DEA, 2015c). General Johan Jooste (Retired) admitted recently, that the use of language might have been more fortunate to depict the situation in national parks (Hübschle, 2017: 65). On the ground there is much more awareness of how language can form people's (audiences) perceptions.

Von Essen et al. (2014) unpacks what poaching is and how it functions in the academic and social sphere. She points towards a simplistic understanding of the phenomenon as a crime or deviance, instead of as a political phenomenon of defiance and radicalisation - rather than seeing poaching and those engaging with it as breaching an existing law, governments should look into social and historical drivers. Rural lifestyles and historical stigmatisation led to radicalisation that sought justification of their socio-political position, expressed, for example, through poaching. Although the DEA stressed in briefings that they support communities living adjacent to conservation areas or within parks, the briefings on specific examples of progress were limited. The programme dedicated to communities - SANParks 'Parks and People' (SANParks, n.d.), also offered scarce insight into how communities have been incentivised towards wildlife conservation by wildlife stock donations and creating employment through programmes. However, the DEA repeatedly stated that these communities were crucial to the long-term solution (Molewa, 2016a). While the language became more aligned, the content stopped producing statistics in order not to 'upset' international donors and the conservation community. In 10 media statements on Integrated Strategic Management Approach (ISMA) held between May 2015 and Jul 2017, Minister Molewa was initially providing clear information regarding four areas of the approach. However, in 2016, briefings became less substantial – the number of arrests and convictions were replaced by successfully closed cases limited to few examples.⁴⁶ That was a strategic move aimed to avoid discontent of the transnational conservation community, including donors.

To summarise, the language of communication between the DEA and public changed between 2011 and early 2017, with 2015 marking the strongest, most conflict - based messages. The language of a threat imposed by powerful international actors was initially rejected by the department, yet, with multi-million donations supporting the anti-poaching efforts, the discourse eventually became dominant. At the same time,

⁴⁶ See, for example, the last media release from September 2017: DEA (2017c), and earlier ones DEA (2015c) or DEA (2016c)

further to a surge in crime that neither environmental departments nor law enforcement could cope with, the national response to poaching was to retreat to old well-known measures of policing and security threats. NATJOINTS was a strong message for international and local audience; this was the first phase of practices that led to securitisation.

Through adopting the language of security, although for different purposes and with different meanings, a self-referential bubble where security threat moves outside the realm of normal politics was created (Floyd, 2008: 58). Internationally, poaching and wildlife trafficking have been linked to terrorism, insurgency and other forms of trafficking. In South Africa, it became a synonym of foreign influence and well organised syndicates. The parallel narrative of impoverished communities stands in a stark contrast with SAPS arrests statistics, where the majority of poachers are at the bottom of the illegal trade pyramid (Figure 2).




Figure 2: Levels of organised crime involved in the rhino horn trade according to police services (Milliken, 2014: 18)

Despite ambitious goals outlined in ISMA and NISCWT, the sentences for poaching merely reflected that story – operations primarily involve arrests of poachers, or in

the SAPS terminology, the fourth and the lowest level of the poaching-trafficking criminal pyramid. Similarly, the number of arrests or conviction rates do not reflect the level of forces involved in the rhino anti-poaching operations (see Table 2). The described process, where language and on ground tactics became militarised, shows that South African agencies were eager to actively respond to the issue, but proceeded with ineffective tools – policies that did not realise and law enforcement that did not bring anticipated results. In the following sections I further describe this situation.

Year	Rhino poached	Arrests
2011	448	232
2012	668	267
2013	1004	343
2014	1215	386
2015	1175	317
2016	1054	668
2017	1028	518
Total	6592	2731

Table 2: Number of poached rhinos between 2011 and 2017 compared with number of arrests made in the same period (DEA, 2017a)

3.3.2 Securitisation of the response to rhino poaching

In the non-language sphere, the first phase of securitisation became evident by employing NATJOINTS in 2011, and its involvement in response to rhino poaching. Never before had security and the military been brought to the anti-poaching equation in South Africa. Secondly, despite the official mandate of the security cluster to lead the operations, it was only in late 2015 when NATJOINTS Priority Committee had stopped being chaired by Fundisile Mketeni, the DEA's deputy director-general for biodiversity and conservation and currently the CEO of SANParks (Rademeyer, 2016b: 22). This, together with aligning the language of the DEA to that of international donors, helped creating a unified message against wildlife crime and improve the country's image among international actors and audiences. In Balzacq's

distinction of audience support, this move was aimed to gain international moral support (Balzacq, Leonard & Ruzicka, 2016: 500). This brought more substantial – political and financial – forms of support. The closing element of the phase occurred when Minister Molewa was ‘joined by security cluster’ during the briefing on ISMA in 2016 (Molewa, 2016b).

The move was met with a mixed response. Some local media and conservation charities welcomed it with relief while others questioned the necessity of security being involved in the rhino issue. Given that NATJOINTS were not able to point to a legal document that constituted their existence, it became a more general issue of the government’s transparency. At the same time, the involvement of security cluster in the rhino poaching response was perceived by the South African agencies as the right move and the best possible response to tackle the problem. Equipped with institutions (security cluster) and bureaucratic practices from apartheid (*dispositif*)⁴⁷, punitive and policing practices (*habitus*) through years, was a default response to the supposed national security threat.⁴⁸

Rademeyer (2016b: 23) suggests that the reason behind the minimal effect of rhino anti-poaching and trafficking law enforcement is a case of the ‘silo effect’. Different agencies and police stations ‘sat’ on data but were not willing to cooperate. This, I argue, means that although security measures were applied (through security cluster, ISMA, language and finances focussing solely on rhino poaching response), the approach failed because of ineffective cooperation and bureaucracy which in turn provided yet another reason for securitisation. Failing to recognise it as the cause of the failure, exceptional measures became a justification of the uniqueness of rhino poaching.

The process of securitisation has been multifaceted and included initial phase where international actors provided an understandable narrative of a security threat that was understood and accepted by South Africa. With their own take, the DEA realised that international involvement may bring potential funds to secure parks (and support the

⁴⁷ See for example Du Plessis & Peté (2006) on during- and post- apartheid dysfunctional administration practices

⁴⁸ It is argued by scholars that this kind of response, together with neoliberal conservation methods and land acquisition, rather than eradication of poaching, brought a surge among impoverished population seen as a form of resistance ((Hubschle, 2016:8-9; Neumann, 1998; Duffy, 2014, Lunstrum, 2014).

solution for poaching), but it would come with a price of higher awareness internationally and continuous requirement for results. Given the lack of those between 2011 - 2014, NATJOINTS members lobbied for a more security-oriented solution, which took form of the ISMA and NISCWT. This was due to the South African agencies' perception of poaching being a crime involving international syndicates, rather than complex socio-economic issue fuelled by an aggressive neoliberal conservation and powerful rhino owners' lobby followed by multilevel corruption. At this stage, I argue, the securitisation process was less intentional and more of a default reaction to what was identified as a threat. However, creating NATJOINTS did not bring the anticipated drop in poaching numbers. The initial 2015 briefings aiming to showcase the effectiveness of rhino security operations with became less frequent, starting from the end of 2016.⁴⁹ When provided, Minister Molewa focused on arrests, occasionally mentioning 'successful' conviction rates ('Latest Official South ...', 2017). Later, in 2016, a handful of successful court cases were all that remained of success stories. By the end of July 2017, the DEA shared the last progress report of Strategic Management Approach with poaching statistics. Presented as a success, a total number of 529 rhinos have been poached in South Africa by June 2017 - 13 rhino fewer than the previous year and 34 per cent less in KNP comparing to the year before⁵⁰. That highlights two potential situations: a) the total number of rhinos were in decline, so it was more difficult to poach them, especially in KNP where intensive anti-poaching activities took place; b) the 'balloon effect' – caused by the situation described in point a) – other parks are less protected and have more opportunities to hunt – therefore, poaching curbed in one place swelled in another. Equally, this could have been caused by overcrowded GLTFCA where approximately 12 rhino poaching groups operate at the same time (Wakefield, 2015). In the absence of more spectacular drops in numbers, the South African and international audience started suspecting something of a conspiracy (Chishakwe, 2014). This was a clear sign of a loss in moral support (Head, 2017). The trend of hiding rather than revealing poaching statistics unveiled lack of deeper engagement with the topic characterised by ensuring numbers are monitored and released on time

⁴⁹ By 2016 they were released approximately four times a year, but not necessarily every quarter. With the beginning of 2017, DEA started releasing statistics on six-month basis.

⁵⁰ The statistics for the full 2017 year of poached animals and arrests were released early in 2018. See Table 2 for details.

to keep the audience satisfied. Although moral support was undermined, there has not been a rejection of measures applied, however. Specifically, is it argued by Jooste, that the stark measures are necessity rather than option (Hubschle, 2017: 65)

More interesting, however, is the narrative of ‘war on poaching’ that continues in international media (Burke, 2017; Bale, 2018) perpetuate the message that distorts the long journey that South Africa, along with many other African countries share in their attempts to preserve their wildlife. That, I argue, evidences the catalyst role of international organisations, governments and intergovernmental organisations in the securitisation process of anti-poaching response in South Africa, which has been entangled in the process of negotiating powers over what is, and what is not effective in tackling the wildlife crime.

3.3.3 Domestic power relations

The domestic rhino horn trade was reinstated in South Africa in April 2017. A financial interest in revoking the ban was not questioned by the court. A recent case of the first online rhino auction (Rhino Horn Auction, 2017), which was firstly given a green light by a local authority, then halted by the DEA and then finally took place after a dramatic court decision, days before the launch. In the aftermath, John Hume complained that the auction was not a great success (Sommerville, 2017) because of the DEA’s (2017c) public reminder that the international rhino horn trade is not legal.

Given the initial discontent of the powerful group of rhino owners, the DEA assembled a commission of inquiry looking into the viability of the rhino horn trade as early as 2010. That was a strategic move to avoid accusations of not allowing the best of all viable options. The recommendations suggested diverse options of which the Inter-Ministerial Committee chose two: application of current policies, with no immediate intention to trade rhino horn, but with the possibility of reconsidering the international option of trade if identified requirements are met. These include: enhanced security to be implemented through NISCWT, community empowerment, effective biological management, implemented, inter alia through adoption of ARCP horn management of stocks and the demand. Secondly, South Africa would not apply for the opening of legal commercial trade in rhino horn during CITES COP17 (Molewa, 2016a).

However, in February 2017, the DEA gazetted a draft allowing rhino horn to be exported as hunting trophy. In addition to this draft regulation, there were two more regarding the domestic rhino horn trade, prohibiting shaving and chopping of rhino horn. This was in line with CITES provisions that have the southern white rhino listed on Appendix II, hence are allowed to be traded, but only under strict regulations for trophy hunting purposes in South Africa or Swaziland. The draft was highly criticised by the media ('Despite poaching ...', 2017), but the measure has not been since voted on, although the trade ban was revoked. The timing was no coincidence. Given the forthcoming lift of the ban, DEA anticipated that the market will be prone to laundering legally obtained horns into the international black market by converting the horn into powder or pieces (Moneron, Okes & Rademeyer, 2017). I hypothesise that the DEA challenge has been not only international pressure, but equally domestic pro-trade groups with powerful connections and ample funding behind them. Equally, private game reserves owners participate in the conservation project by, for example, buying wildlife or removing fences in areas bordering national parks. Widened in such way, conservation corridors allow wildlife to roam freely and provide opportunities for tourism development. It is therefore unlikely that the DEA and rhino breeders are allies, but power relations between the DEA and rhino breeders show that their interests may overlap at some points. Yet, as shown in various sources (Rademeyer, 2012; Rademeyer 2016a; 2016b; Hübschle, 2016a), corruption at lower levels amongst provincial administrations, parks, conservation professionals and rhino breeders and farmers, creates a powerful assemblage that practice illegal rhino horn trade and exercise political power games.

Another 'silent' actor amidst an internal scramble over South Africa's natural resources is identified as 'local community' in the literature. In DEA language, this vague term refers to people living adjacent to or in the park. These are the communities, that political ecology sees as the most vulnerable to neoliberal conservation attempts by transnational conservation community.

I argue, that the implication of security narrative, both in language and practices, is being utilised by both international and South African actors that enables green accumulation, discussed in previous chapters. The process is less subtle in South Africa than in Mozambique where thousands of people were 'voluntarily relocated'

from the park to create profitable ‘wilderness’⁵¹. Mechanisms are place and time specific, but examples describe a general process in which land seen as conservation or nature-based tourism profitable is being acquired by the state via SANParks or by international organisations. Small land owners, farmers and dwellers as well as specific communities are promised benefits from the land via game or tourism, should they successfully reconstitute the land. This shows in the way SANParks annual report describe the process:

‘Numerous communities have lodged claims against parcels of land within national parks. In some instances, the claims are still being verified while in others, the process has been completed and settlements effected. As part of the settlement agreements, SANParks has committed to develop and implement a beneficiation programme which will enable claimant communities to receive specified benefits.’
(SANParks, 2017: 7).

An example of such practice is meticulously described by Ramutsindela and Shabangu (2013). Hailed as successful, the Makuleke land claim was finalised in late 1990s. Yet, it was in opposition to SANParks plans for GLTFCA, eventually established in 2002. Although regaining the ownership, the community did not profit from the concession as it was projected. Effectively, the land was accumulated by the state and Peace Park Foundation. Furthermore, the authors suggest how commercialisation of SANParks in 2000 brought the fear that further land claims may jeopardise the integrity of the transfrontier park project, which was internationally donated and supported, *nota bene*, by Anton Rupert, and which was aimed to bring profit to the state. Such commercialisation can be seen as one example of neoliberal conservation, where nature is being seen as capital that should be reproduced⁵². Thakoli (2016) focusses on Maloti Drakensberg Transfrontier Conservation Area and Greater Mapungubwe Transfrontier Conservation Area which, through a subsequent buyout of the land along the parks, in in the hands of the state along international

⁵¹ Lunstrum (2010), Massé (2016), Massé and Lunstrum (2016).

⁵² We read ‘adopting the Commercialisation Strategy in 2000 was that competing social needs put a strain on the public revenue and nature conservation should leverage private sector investment through tourism development to partly fund its existence. The strategy led to 11 concessions sites, seven of which are in the KNP3, two in Addo Elephant National Park and two in Table Mountain National Park.’ (Ramutsindela and Shabangu, 2013: 449)

organisation. He argues that policing, exercised through interstate security agreements (here with Lesotho and Zimbabwe) enable encroachment under the guise of surveillance against supposedly high-risk criminal activities (Thakholi, 2016: 106).

Rural dwellers, or communities, are often described as not being able to ‘perform’ conservation jobs or are not capable of conserving the nature and wildlife of their lands ‘properly’ (Ramutsindela, 2016a). Such pejorative labelling is then being extended to a risk of poaching (or at least subsistence hunting) and linked to security issues (Essen, 2014; White, 2014; Marijnen, 2017). Indeed, specific segments of society are shown as supporting ‘poaching’ and constitute a security threat (Duffy et al., 2016). Equally, framing of undefined ‘local populations’ or ‘local communities’ by international actors and audiences, imposing a security threat by linking them to terrorism and insurgency, framing native African populations as incapable of self-governance and requiring assistance, have provided ground for structuring an international practice of justification of security in projects expanding conservation-tourism areas. Hence, I conclude that security narrative has been a new addition to the international assemblage state and non-state actors’ techniques to forge neoliberal conservation in South Africa. Although not a main subject of the thesis, it substantiates argument of why and how domestic and international actors, although with different agendas, can benefit from imposed security threat.

The above studies are only a small part of wide scholarship that prove that the South African conservation scene is full of powerful actors, going to great lengths to secure their interests. It also proves that securitisation is utilised to force interests of various actors, often negotiating their power among each other and those of audiences.

3.4 Findings

Above research into the mechanisms of the securitised response to rhino poaching has proven to be a multi-layered and multi-actor issue. It has also been shown that the process is not simply linear, although proven to be time-related. Hence application of the ‘field of practices’ as an analytical tool helped in fleshing out singular practices. Through the described examples, themselves just an excerpt of information available, I provided a description of changing relations between identified actors that influence

the development of an overall discourse of poaching as a threat and responses to the phenomenon. The research focussed on practices that represent these responses and the way South African governmental and international conservation organisations created agency to securitised rhino anti-poaching and embed it into a wider strategy of acquiring control over conservation projects. Below I present the full list of my findings:

1. The initial phase of securitisation was triggered by foreign actors and aimed towards framing the issue of an abrupt spike in rhino poaching incidents as extraordinary in order to attract attention, finances and enable policies that would allow control of the issue via proxy measures.
2. The subsequent phase of securitization was initiated when the DEA accepted the framing of poaching as a security threat due to the proximity of language and discourse that the international narrative offered – its own past and hard-line policing and response to crime. Yet, for the DEA, the aim was to secure international moral support and attract funds for the unprecedented phenomenon. Although the country introduced many policy tools and instruments (NSSSRSA, NCWRU, TOPS and trade ban), they have been proven to fail to fully address the complex issue. Hence the discussion of the viable solution, influenced by international actors, provided ground for subsequent application of security apparatus to rhino poaching.
3. The evolving phase of the securitisation was triggered by assembling NATJOINTS, or the ‘security cluster’ and proclaiming rhino poaching as a national security threat, followed by declaring it a National Priority Crime. Soon after, the security cluster raise to prominence. As their main dispositif was deeply rooted in security tools, this is what they presented as an ultimate solution – a hard-line crime and threat combating response. This was fully in line with the international discourse of security issue. As the language of DEA and SANParks changed, the process became more embedded.
4. The final stage (or the closing stage) of securitisation was a move from the minister of DEA, who in 2015 and early 2016 invited a list of security cluster representatives to departmental briefings in order to show commitment and that the security cluster was responsible for solving the issue. This was also a move to gain approval from increasingly discontented domestic and international actors, who were unimpressed by the poor results of operations. Similarly, a commitment to transparency was aimed

at through frequent ISMA briefings. As the statistics of rhino poaching were not decreasing, information provided was gradually focussing on success stories and arrests statistics. The formations of NISCWT strategy contained a fully developed narrative on poaching and poachers as posing a threat to national security and those who guard wildlife.

5. Against the backdrop of securitisation, one of the opportunities the DEA and other state agencies missed was realising that the security narrative can be used against those opposing large-scale conservation areas: land claimants, those in possession of lands adjacent to parks and reserves that are often specific communities. Although gaining control over land resources through conservation means was not a new process, the security nexus provided a fresh platform for capital accumulation. Presented as posing a risk, stimulating poaching or being vulnerable to poaching gangs, these groups were easier to marginalise, in order to pursue neoliberal conservation projects.

6. Practices of securitisation sampled through analysis of the anti-poaching response suggest changing power relations between actors as they gain and lose power depending upon several contextual factors and a successfully instilled that have to be accepted by other players. In this sense, the securitised rhino poaching response may be overturned with a changing government and pressure from the international regime. I claim that it is not fully clear whether initially successful securitisation will devolve, or desecuritise, to reach a more accurate response to the multifaceted issue of wildlife crime. It will also stop being used as a proxy for land accumulation and deepening social inequalities in South Africa.

7. Securitisation, war rhetoric and an arms race in order to 'protect the rhino' has had long term consequences, both directly as a way to forge neoliberal conservation and indirectly, by perpetuating power relations similar to those of the colonial order.

Importantly, securitising the anti-poaching response brings a risk of not looking for other viable solutions. Securitised issues may have ended in an impasse, as in case of stable poaching statistics when only minor successes are recorded.

8. Studying the securitisation mechanism allows us to go beyond the rhetoric of militarisation and equips us with apparatus that allows us to unpack the phenomenon,

its reasons and consequences better than political ecology approach, which overemphasise language as a main medium of change. Finally, it allows us to investigate consequences of the securitised approach and measures potential impacts of phenomena on conservation in South Africa and beyond.

CHAPTER 4 – CONCLUSION

Since 2010, South Africa has gone a long way in learning how to protect and capitalise on the natural resources the country has in abundance. These resources include wildlife that is currently exposed to various risks, including poaching and trafficking. Within this research, I analysed the problem of a growing convergence of security and conservation, by employing securitisation theory. I have done so because of the evident discourse that employs security language, but equally to show that such security language does influence the sphere of policies and is entangled with power politics. My research question sought to address the security practices of the anti-poaching agenda, that in South Africa has almost entirely focussed on rhinoceros.

In chapter 1, I discussed literature that informs the current body of research and showed that, although academics engage with various phenomena at the intersection of conservation and security, there are still many interesting questions that need answering. These are, *inter alia*, how security and conservation are entangled and to what degree they are part of the bigger environmental security discourses that inform and influence the current discussion on means and aims of the response to wildlife crime. On many of them, I aimed to address only a small part. In chapter 2, I presented the theoretical and methodological approach. Through application of discourse and document analysis, I interrogated the South African historical and cultural context that created a facilitating ground for the global security narrative. I further outlined the actors and practices that produced a response to rhino-poaching throughout a specific time span. As a result, I have been able to identify much more complex power relations and more actors that have influenced the narrative. Specifically, the research showed that, although South African government agencies are heavily influenced by a global threat narrative, they did not accept the security narrative immediately, but over a course of five years. Secondly, there has been ongoing friction over how the poaching response should be framed between security cluster agencies, with the security response prevailing, as a well-established and historically tried practice of combating threats. On the global level, the changing language promoted poaching crisis, terrorism and threat as dominant themes, which gradually influenced South African politics. What has become evident is that the process of securitisation of the response to wildlife crime and poaching has been effective on the international level,

where actors like the U.S. used terrorism and insurgency as a way to deploy money and capacity building support as part of extraordinary measures to respond to an essentially produced threat.

Gaining importance in forging such an understanding of the issue, intergovernmental agencies and the non-profit sector joined the choir. The research showed that investing money in the anti-poaching produced a more aligned response from the South African Department of Environmental Affairs, which, as a result accepted the security response as a dominant solution and pleasing the wider global audience. That was done to gain moral support and create and attract more international funding.

Simultaneously, it showed that on the domestic level, there are also other factors, like corruption or an inefficient organisational culture which undermined responses to poaching and trafficking. Through a careful analysis of actors and power relations, I have shown that South Africa securitised its rhino anti-poaching response, because and through international actors, yet with strong pressure from local players. This has been shown through engagement of the security cluster, zoning of Kruger National Park and elevation of rhino poaching to national security threat.

Finally, I showed, that although initially reluctant, South Africa embraced a securitised response and employed it as a new tool for the old struggle – that of land restitution. Security has successfully been applied as a factor that influences decisions as the DEA and SANParks are actively promoting the strategy of land acquisition, again, because and through international actors. In regards to the latter, the research also showed that green accumulation has many shades and forms that do not always come with or through violent means. Although on the national level, securitisation bears questionable implications for the society, internationally it was seen as positive and necessary move.

The research has also shown potential further ways to explore the topic of securitisation of the anti-poaching. First, the analysis can be used to examine other southern African countries. Secondly, by the theoretical focus on practices it allows to examine the extent of the phenomenon, including themes of environmental justice.

Lastly, studies of securitised responses bear some policy implications. These point us towards the way in which international actors can desecuritise their environmental discourses in order to produce informed and realistic solutions to the problem of

wildlife crime. For South Africa, there must be a better understanding of the role the country can play if they manage to apply more society-oriented solutions. For international community, there must greater comprehension of impacts their actions create.

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